5 citations · 13 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers
Accountable Private Set Cardinality for Distributed Measurement
Ellis Fenske, Akshaya Mani, Aaron Johnson +1
We introduce cryptographic protocols for securely and efficiently computing the cardinality of set union and set intersection. Our private set-cardinality protocols (PSC) are desig…
Differentially Private Maximal Information Coefficients
John Lazarsfeld, Aaron Johnson, Emmanuel Adeniran
The Maximal Information Coefficient (MIC) is a powerful statistic to identify dependencies between variables. However, it may be applied to sensitive data, and publishing it could…
FlashFlow: A Secure Speed Test for Tor
Matthew Traudt, Rob Jansen, Aaron Johnson
The Tor network uses a measurement system to estimate its relays' forwarding capacity and to balance traffic among them. This system has been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial…
Understanding Tor Usage with Privacy-Preserving Measurement
Akshaya Mani, T Wilson-Brown, Rob Jansen +2
The Tor anonymity network is difficult to measure because, if not done carefully, measurements could risk the privacy (and potentially the safety) of the network's users. Recent wo…
Tempest: Temporal Dynamics in Anonymity Systems
Ryan Wails, Yixin Sun, Aaron Johnson +2
Many recent proposals for anonymous communication omit from their security analyses a consideration of the effects of time on important system components. In practice, many compone…
Avoiding The Man on the Wire: Improving Tor's Security with Trust-Aware Path Selection
Aaron Johnson, Rob Jansen, Aaron D. Jaggard +2
Tor users are vulnerable to deanonymization by an adversary that can observe some Tor relays or some parts of the network. We demonstrate that previous network-aware path-selection…
Defending Tor from Network Adversaries: A Case Study of Network Path Prediction
Joshua Juen, Aaron Johnson, Anupam Das +2
The Tor anonymity network has been shown vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks by autonomous systems and Internet exchanges, which can observe different overlay hops belonging to…
Representing Network Trust and Using It to Improve Anonymous Communication
Aaron D. Jaggard, Aaron Johnson, Paul Syverson +1
Motivated by the effectiveness of correlation attacks against Tor, the censorship arms race, and observations of malicious relays in Tor, we propose that Tor users capture their tr…
Probabilistic Analysis of Onion Routing in a Black-box Model
Joan Feigenbaum, Aaron Johnson, Paul Syverson
We perform a probabilistic analysis of onion routing. The analysis is presented in a black-box model of anonymous communication in the Universally Composable framework that abstrac…