8 papers
On Signed Network Games with Binary Actions
Martina Vanelli, Laura Arditti, Giacomo Como +1
We study binary-action pairwise-separable graphical games that encompass both coordination and anti-coordination network games. Our model is grounded in an underlying directed sign…
How competitive are pay-as-bid auction games?
Martina Vanelli, Giacomo Como, Fabio Fagnani
We study the pay-as-bid auction game, a supply function model with discriminatory pricing and asymmetric firms. In this game, strategies are non-decreasing supply functions relatin…
Equilibria in Network Constrained Markets with System Operator
Giacomo Como, Fabio Fagnani, Leonardo Massai +1
We study a networked economic system composed of producers supplying a single homogeneous good to a number of geographically separated markets and of a centralized authority, c…
Nash equilibria of the pay-as-bid auction with K-Lipschitz supply functions
Martina Vanelli, Giacomo Como, Fabio Fagnani
We model a system of n asymmetric firms selling a homogeneous good in a common market through a pay-as-bid auction. Every producer chooses as its strategy a supply function returni…
Equilibria and learning dynamics in mixed network coordination/anti-coordination games
Laura Arditti, Giacomo Como, Fabio Fagnani +1
Whilst network coordination games and network anti-coordination games have received a considerable amount of attention in the literature, network games with coexisting coordinating…
Robust Coordination of Linear Threshold Dynamics on Directed Weighted Networks
Laura Arditti, Giacomo Como, Fabio Fagnani +1
We study asynchronous dynamics in a network of interacting agents updating their binary states according to a time-varying threshold rule. Specifically, agents revise their state a…
Robustness of Nash Equilibria in Network Games
Laura Arditti, Giacomo Como, Fabio Fagnani +1
We analyze the robustness of (pure strategy) Nash equilibria for network games against perturbations of the players' utility functions. We first derive a simple characterization of…
On games with coordinating and anti-coordinating agents
Martina Vanelli, Laura Arditti, Giacomo Como +1
This work studies Nash equilibria for games where a mixture of coordinating and anti-coordinating agents, with possibly heterogeneous thresholds, coexist and interact through an al…