From the 1 of 4 linked papers with an AI index.
4 papers
Dynamic Cheap Talk without Feedback
Atulya Jain
The paper analyzes a dynamic sender‑receiver game where the sender observes a Markovian state but cannot see the receiver’s actions, showing that despite the lack of feedback the s…
Calibrated Forecasting and Persuasion
Atulya Jain, Vianney Perchet
We study a dynamic game where an expert sends probabilistic forecasts to a decision-maker. The decision-maker verifies these forecasts using a calibration test based on past data.…
On the Inefficiency of Social Learning
Florian Brandl, Wanying Huang, Atulya Jain
We study whether a social planner can improve the efficiency of learning, measured by the expected total welfare loss, in a sequential decision-making environment. Agents arrive in…
Efficiency in Games with Incomplete Information
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Atulya Jain +1
We study games with incomplete information and characterize when a feasible outcome is Pareto efficient. Outcomes with excessive randomization are inefficient: generically, the tot…