29 citations · 81 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for
11 papers
Breaking Bad: How Compilers Break Constant-Time Implementations
Moritz Schneider, Daniele Lain, Ivan Puddu +2
The implementations of most hardened cryptographic libraries use defensive programming techniques for side-channel resistance. These techniques are usually specified as guidelines…
On (the Lack of) Code Confidentiality in Trusted Execution Environments
Ivan Puddu, Moritz Schneider, Daniele Lain +2
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have been proposed as a solution to protect code confidentiality in scenarios where computation is outsourced to an untrusted operator. We stu…
It's TEEtime: A New Architecture Bringing Sovereignty to Smartphones
Friederike Groschupp, Mark Kuhne, Moritz Schneider +3
Modern smartphones are complex systems in which control over phone resources is exercised by phone manufacturers, OS vendors, and users. These stakeholders have diverse and often c…
SoK: Hardware-supported Trusted Execution Environments
Moritz Schneider, Ramya Jayaram Masti, Shweta Shinde +2
The growing complexity of modern computing platforms and the need for strong isolation protections among their software components has led to the increased adoption of Trusted Exec…
Systematic Prevention of On-Core Timing Channels by Full Temporal Partitioning
Nils Wistoff, Moritz Schneider, Frank K. Gürkaynak +2
Microarchitectural timing channels enable unwanted information flow across security boundaries, violating fundamental security assumptions. They leverage timing variations of sever…
Sovereign Smartphone: To Enjoy Freedom We Have to Control Our Phones
Friederike Groschupp, Moritz Schneider, Ivan Puddu +2
The majority of smartphones either run iOS or Android operating systems. This has created two distinct ecosystems largely controlled by Apple and Google - they dictate which applic…
Composite Enclaves: Towards Disaggregated Trusted Execution
Moritz Schneider, Aritra Dhar, Ivan Puddu +2
The ever-rising computation demand is forcing the move from the CPU to heterogeneous specialized hardware, which is readily available across modern datacenters through disaggregate…
Frontal Attack: Leaking Control-Flow in SGX via the CPU Frontend
Ivan Puddu, Moritz Schneider, Miro Haller +1
We introduce a new timing side-channel attack on Intel CPU processors. Our Frontal attack exploits timing differences that arise from how the CPU frontend fetches and processes ins…
Prevention of Microarchitectural Covert Channels on an Open-Source 64-bit RISC-V Core
Nils Wistoff, Moritz Schneider, Frank K. Gürkaynak +2
Covert channels enable information leakage across security boundaries of the operating system. Microarchitectural covert channels exploit changes in execution timing resulting from…
Cyber-Risks in Paper Voting
David M. Sommer, Moritz Schneider, Jannik Gut +1
Paper ballot voting with its fully-reviewable paper-trail is usually considered as more secure than their e-voting counterparts, given the large number of recent incidents. In this…
TEEvil: Identity Lease via Trusted Execution Environments
Ivan Puddu, Daniele Lain, Moritz Schneider +3
We investigate identity lease, a new type of service in which users lease their identities to third parties by providing them with full or restricted access to their online account…