6 citations · 26 across the 19 of their papers we have counts for
23 papers
Single-Item Auctions with a Monopolist Intermediary
Jingyi Liu, Aviad Rubinstein, Ertem Nusret Tas +2
Classical optimal auction theory assumes that bids reach the seller directly. We study how this picture changes when a revenue-maximizing intermediary controls access to the seller…
Optimal Good-Case Latency for Sleepy Consensus
Yuval Efron, Joachim Neu, Ling Ren +1
In the context of Byzantine consensus problems such as Byzantine broadcast (BB) and Byzantine agreement (BA), the good-case setting aims to study the minimal possible latency of a…
From Permissioned to Proof-of-Stake Consensus
Jovan Komatovic, Andrew Lewis-Pye, Joachim Neu +2
This paper presents the first generic compiler that transforms any permissioned consensus protocol into a proof-of-stake permissionless consensus protocol. For each of the followin…
Consensus Under Adversary Majority Done Right
Srivatsan Sridhar, Ertem Nusret Tas, Joachim Neu +2
A specter is haunting consensus protocols--the specter of adversary majority. Dolev and Strong in 1983 showed an early possibility for up to 99% adversaries. Yet, other works show…
Bitcoin Staking
Xinshu Dong, Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos, Ertem Nusret Tas +4
The idea of security sharing goes back to Nakamoto's introduction of merge mining, a technique that enables Bitcoin miners to reuse their hash power to bootstrap and secure other P…
Commitment Attacks on Ethereum's Reward Mechanism
Roozbeh Sarenche, Ertem Nusret Tas, Barnabe Monnot +2
Validators in permissionless, large-scale blockchains, such as Ethereum, are typically payoff-maximizing, rational actors. Ethereum relies on in-protocol incentives, like rewards f…
A Circuit Approach to Constructing Blockchains on Blockchains
Ertem Nusret Tas, David Tse, Yifei Wang
Since the creation of Bitcoin 15 years ago, there has been an explosion in the number of permissionless blockchains. Each of these blockchains provides an open ledger that anyone c…
Short Paper: Accountable Safety Implies Finality
Joachim Neu, Ertem Nusret Tas, David Tse
Motivated by proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchains such as Ethereum, two key desiderata have recently been studied for Byzantine-fault tolerant (BFT) state-machine replication (SMR) con…
Vector Commitments with Efficient Updates
Ertem Nusret Tas, Dan Boneh
Dynamic vector commitments that enable local updates of opening proofs have applications ranging from verifiable databases with membership changes to stateless clients on blockchai…
Interchain Timestamping for Mesh Security
Ertem Nusret Tas, Runchao Han, David Tse +2
Fourteen years after the invention of Bitcoin, there has been a proliferation of many permissionless blockchains. Each such chain provides a public ledger that can be written to an…
Accountable Safety for Rollups
Ertem Nusret Tas, John Adler, Mustafa Al-Bassam +3
Accountability, the ability to provably identify protocol violators, gained prominence as the main economic argument for the security of proof-of-stake (PoS) protocols. Rollups, th…
Proofs of Proof-of-Stake with Sublinear Complexity
Shresth Agrawal, Joachim Neu, Ertem Nusret Tas +1
Popular Ethereum wallets (like MetaMask) entrust centralized infrastructure providers (e.g., Infura) to run the consensus client logic on their behalf. As a result, these wallets a…
Goldfish: No More Attacks on Ethereum?!
Francesco D'Amato, Joachim Neu, Ertem Nusret Tas +1
The LMD GHOST consensus protocol is a critical component of proof-of-stake Ethereum. In its current form, this protocol is brittle, as evidenced by recent attacks and patching atte…
Cryptoeconomic Security for Data Availability Committees
Ertem Nusret Tas, Dan Boneh
Layer 2 systems have received increasing attention due to their potential to scale the throughput of L1 blockchains. To avoid the cost of putting data on chain, these systems incre…
Bitcoin-Enhanced Proof-of-Stake Security: Possibilities and Impossibilities
Ertem Nusret Tas, David Tse, Fangyu Gai +3
Bitcoin is the most secure blockchain in the world, supported by the immense hash power of its Proof-of-Work miners. Proof-of-Stake chains are energy-efficient, have fast finality…
Two Attacks On Proof-of-Stake GHOST/Ethereum
Joachim Neu, Ertem Nusret Tas, David Tse
We present two attacks targeting the Proof-of-Stake (PoS) Ethereum consensus protocol. The first attack suggests a fundamental conceptual incompatibility between PoS and the Greedy…
Light Clients for Lazy Blockchains
Ertem Nusret Tas, David Tse, Lei Yang +1
Lazy blockchains decouple consensus from transaction verification and execution to increase throughput. Although they can contain invalid transactions (e.g., double spends) as a re…
Babylon: Reusing Bitcoin Mining to Enhance Proof-of-Stake Security
Ertem Nusret Tas, David Tse, Fisher Yu +1
Bitcoin is the most secure blockchain in the world, supported by the immense hash power of its Proof-of-Work miners, but consumes huge amount of energy. Proof-of-Stake chains are e…
Three Attacks on Proof-of-Stake Ethereum
Caspar Schwarz-Schilling, Joachim Neu, Barnabé Monnot +3
Recently, two attacks were presented against Proof-of-Stake (PoS) Ethereum: one where short-range reorganizations of the underlying consensus chain are used to increase individual…
The Availability-Accountability Dilemma and its Resolution via Accountability Gadgets
Joachim Neu, Ertem Nusret Tas, David Tse
For applications of Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) consensus protocols where the participants are economic agents, recent works highlighted the importance of accountability: the ab…
Snap-and-Chat Protocols: System Aspects
Joachim Neu, Ertem Nusret Tas, David Tse
The availability-finality dilemma says that blockchain protocols cannot be both available under dynamic participation and safe under network partition. Snap-and-chat protocols have…
Ebb-and-Flow Protocols: A Resolution of the Availability-Finality Dilemma
Joachim Neu, Ertem Nusret Tas, David Tse
The CAP theorem says that no blockchain can be live under dynamic participation and safe under temporary network partitions. To resolve this availability-finality dilemma, we formu…
Everything is a Race and Nakamoto Always Wins
Amir Dembo, Sreeram Kannan, Ertem Nusret Tas +4
Nakamoto invented the longest chain protocol, and claimed its security by analyzing the private double-spend attack, a race between the adversary and the honest nodes to grow a lon…