4 citations · 10 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers · 1 filter
On Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior and Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium
S. Nageeb Ali, Ce Liu
We show that in Greenberg (1989)'s coalitional repeated game situation, every nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior is a subset of the set of Perfect Coalition…
The Political Economy of Zero-Sum Thinking
S. Nageeb Ali, Maximilian Mihm, Lucas Siga
This paper offers a strategic rationale for zero-sum thinking in elections. We show that asymmetric information and distributional considerations together make voters wary of polic…
Who Controls the Agenda Controls the Polity
S. Nageeb Ali, B. Douglas Bernheim, Alexander W. Bloedel +1
This paper models legislative decision-making with an agenda setter who can propose policies sequentially, tailoring each proposal to the status quo that prevails after prior votes…
Sequential Veto Bargaining with Incomplete Information
S. Nageeb Ali, Navin Kartik, Andreas Kleiner
We study sequential bargaining between a proposer and a veto player. Both have single-peaked preferences, but the proposer is uncertain about the veto player's ideal point. The pro…
How to Sell Hard Information
S. Nageeb Ali, Nima Haghpanah, Xiao Lin +1
The seller of an asset has the option to buy hard information about the value of the asset from an intermediary. The seller can then disclose the acquired information before sellin…
Communication and Cooperation in Markets
S. Nageeb Ali, David A. Miller
Many markets rely on traders truthfully communicating who has cheated in the past and ostracizing those traders from future trade. This paper investigates when truthful communicati…
Coalitions in Repeated Games
S. Nageeb Ali, Ce Liu
This paper proposes a framework and solution concept for repeated coalitional behavior. We model history-dependent schemes that deter coalitions from blocking using continuation pr…