9 citations · 25 across the 15 of their papers we have counts for
12 papers · 1 filter
Delegation in Strategic Environments and Equilibrium Uniqueness
Fedor Sandomirskiy, Ben Wincelberg
We ask when a normal-form game yields a single equilibrium prediction, even if players can coordinate by delegating play to an intermediary such as a platform or a cartel. Delegati…
Monotonicity and Bracketing in Games
Fedor Sandomirskiy, Po Hyun Sung, Omer Tamuz +1
We study solution concepts for normal-form games. We obtain a characterization of Nash equilibria and logit quantal response equilibria, as well as generalizations capturing non-ex…
The geometry of consumer preference aggregation
Fedor Sandomirskiy, Philip Ushchev
We revisit a classical question of how individual consumer preferences and incomes shape aggregate behavior. We develop a method that applies to populations with homothetic prefere…
Stable Matching as Transport: a Welfarist Perspective on Market Design
Federico Echenique, Joseph Root, Fedor Sandomirskiy
This paper links matching markets with aligned preferences to optimal transport theory. We show that stability, efficiency, and fairness emerge as solutions to a parametric family…
A Separability Foundation for Random Coefficients Logit
Fedor Sandomirskiy, Po Hyun Sung, Omer Tamuz +1
We study stochastic choice across decision problems, each represented as a menu of action labels paired with observable outcome vectors. We propose a consistency condition for beha…
Feasible Conditional Belief Distributions
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy
Agents receive private signals about an unknown state. The resulting joint belief distributions are complex and lack a simple characterization. Our key insight is that, when condit…
Beckmann's approach to multi-item multi-bidder auctions
Alexander V. Kolesnikov, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Aleh Tsyvinski +1
We consider the problem of revenue-maximizing Bayesian auction design with several bidders having independent private values over several items. We show that it can be reduced to t…
Efficiency in Random Resource Allocation and Social Choice
Federico Echenique, Joseph Root, Fedor Sandomirskiy
We study efficiency in general collective choice problems where agents have ordinal preferences and randomization is allowed. We explore the structure of preference profiles where…
Bayesian Persuasion with Mediators
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy
An informed sender communicates with an uninformed receiver through a sequence of uninformed mediators; agents' utilities depend on receiver's action and the state. For any number…
Private Private Information
Kevin He, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Omer Tamuz
Private signals model noisy information about an unknown state. Although these signals are called "private," they may still carry information about each other. Our paper introduces…
On social networks that support learning
Itai Arieli, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Rann Smorodinsky
It is well understood that the structure of a social network is critical to whether or not agents can aggregate information correctly. In this paper, we study social networks that…
Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy +1
We study the set of possible joint posterior belief distributions of a group of agents who share a common prior regarding a binary state, and who observe some information structure…