133 citations · 200 across the 18 of their papers we have counts for
24 papers
Reasoning without Regret
Tarun Chitra
Chain-of-thought reasoning enables large language models to solve multi-step tasks by framing problem solving as sequential decision problems. Outcome-based rewards, which provide…
The Specter (and Spectra) of Miner Extractable Value
Guillermo Angeris, Tarun Chitra, Theo Diamandis +1
Miner extractable value (MEV) refers to any excess value that a transaction validator can realize by manipulating the ordering of transactions. In this work, we introduce a simple…
Towards a Theory of Maximal Extractable Value II: Uncertainty
Tarun Chitra
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) is value extractable by temporary monopoly power commonly found in decentralized systems. This extraction stems from a lack of user privacy upon tra…
The Geometry of Constant Function Market Makers
Guillermo Angeris, Tarun Chitra, Theo Diamandis +2
Constant function market makers (CFMMs) are the most popular type of decentralized trading venue for cryptocurrency tokens. In this paper, we give a very general geometric framewor…
Attacks on Dynamic DeFi Interest Rate Curves
Tarun Chitra, Peteris Erins, Kshitij Kulkarni
As decentralized money market protocols continue to grow in value locked, there have been a number of optimizations proposed for improving capital efficiency. One set of proposals…
An Efficient Algorithm for Optimal Routing Through Constant Function Market Makers
Theo Diamandis, Max Resnick, Tarun Chitra +1
Constant function market makers (CFMMs) such as Uniswap have facilitated trillions of dollars of digital asset trades and have billions of dollars of liquidity. One natural questio…
Credible, Optimal Auctions via Public Broadcast
Tarun Chitra, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Kshitij Kulkarni
We study auction design in a setting where agents can communicate over a censorship-resistant broadcast channel like the ones we can implement over a public blockchain. We seek to…
A primer on perpetuals
Guillermo Angeris, Tarun Chitra, Alex Evans +1
We consider a continuous-time financial market with no arbitrage and no transactions costs. In this setting, we introduce two types of perpetual contracts, one in which the payoff…
Dynamic Pricing for Non-fungible Resources: Designing Multidimensional Blockchain Fee Markets
Theo Diamandis, Alex Evans, Tarun Chitra +1
Public blockchains implement a fee mechanism to allocate scarce computational resources across competing transactions. Most existing fee market designs utilize a joint, fungible un…
Towards a Theory of Maximal Extractable Value I: Constant Function Market Makers
Kshitij Kulkarni, Theo Diamandis, Tarun Chitra
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) refers to excess value captured by miners (or validators) from users in a cryptocurrency network. This excess value often comes from reordering user…
Optimal Routing for Constant Function Market Makers
Guillermo Angeris, Tarun Chitra, Alex Evans +1
We consider the problem of optimally executing an order involving multiple crypto-assets, sometimes called tokens, on a network of multiple constant function market makers (CFMMs).…
Unity is Strength: A Formalization of Cross-Domain Maximal Extractable Value
Alexandre Obadia, Alejo Salles, Lakshman Sankar +3
The multi-chain future is upon us. Modular architectures are coming to maturity across the ecosystem to scale bandwidth and throughput of cryptocurrency. One example of such is the…
Replicating Monotonic Payoffs Without Oracles
Guillermo Angeris, Alex Evans, Tarun Chitra
In this paper, we show that any monotonic payoff can be replicated using only liquidity provider shares in constant function market makers (CFMMs), without the need for additional…
Constant Function Market Makers: Multi-Asset Trades via Convex Optimization
Guillermo Angeris, Akshay Agrawal, Alex Evans +2
The rise of Ethereum and other blockchains that support smart contracts has led to the creation of decentralized exchanges (DEXs), such as Uniswap, Balancer, Curve, mStable, and Su…
Optimal Fees for Geometric Mean Market Makers
Alex Evans, Guillermo Angeris, Tarun Chitra
Constant Function Market Makers (CFMMs) are a family of automated market makers that enable censorship-resistant decentralized exchange on public blockchains. Arbitrage trades have…
Replicating Market Makers
Guillermo Angeris, Alex Evans, Tarun Chitra
We present a method for constructing Constant Function Market Makers (CFMMs) whose portfolio value functions match a desired payoff. More specifically, we show that the space of co…
A Note on Privacy in Constant Function Market Makers
Guillermo Angeris, Alex Evans, Tarun Chitra
Constant function market makers (CFMMs) such as Uniswap, Balancer, Curve, and mStable, among many others, make up some of the largest decentralized exchanges on Ethereum and other…
When does the tail wag the dog? Curvature and market making
Guillermo Angeris, Alex Evans, Tarun Chitra
Liquidity and trading activity on constant function market makers (CFMMs) such as Uniswap, Curve, and Balancer has grown significantly in the second half of 2020. Much of the growt…
Why Stake When You Can Borrow?
Tarun Chitra, Alex Evans
As smart contract platforms autonomously manage billions of dollars of capital, quantifying the portfolio risk that investors engender in these systems is increasingly important. R…
Improved Price Oracles: Constant Function Market Makers
Guillermo Angeris, Tarun Chitra
Automated market makers, first popularized by Hanson's logarithmic market scoring rule (or LMSR) for prediction markets, have become important building blocks, called 'primitives,'…
Competitive equilibria between staking and on-chain lending
Tarun Chitra
Proof of Stake (PoS) is a burgeoning Sybil resistance mechanism that aims to have a digital asset ("token") serve as security collateral in crypto networks. However, PoS has so far…
An analysis of Uniswap markets
Guillermo Angeris, Hsien-Tang Kao, Rei Chiang +2
Uniswap -- and other constant product markets -- appear to work well in practice despite their simplicity. In this paper, we give a simple formal analysis of constant product marke…
Agent-Based Simulations of Blockchain protocols illustrated via Kadena's Chainweb
Tarun Chitra, Monica Quaintance, Stuart Haber +1
While many distributed consensus protocols provide robust liveness and consistency guarantees under the presence of malicious actors, quantitative estimates of how economic incenti…
Committee Selection is More Similar Than You Think: Evidence from Avalanche and Stellar
Tarun Chitra, Uthsav Chitra
Increased interest in scalable and high-throughput blockchains has led to an explosion in the number of committee selection methods in the literature. Committee selection mechanism…