activity
20172026
most citedData Market Design through Deep Learning

4 citations · 9 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

7 papers

cs.IR2026

Who Are We Recommending To? Recommender Systems in the Agentic Web

Himan Abdollahpouri, Kyle Kretschman, Sai Ravindranath +2

For two decades, recommender systems have been designed under the assumption that a human directly consumes each recommendation: receiving, interpreting, and acting upon it. The em…

cs.GT2025

Information Design With Large Language Models

Paul Duetting, Safwan Hossain, Tao Lin +4

Information design is typically studied through the lens of Bayesian signaling, where signals shape beliefs purely based on their correlation with the true state of the world. Howe…

cs.GT2024

Deep Reinforcement Learning for Sequential Combinatorial Auctions

Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, Zhe Feng, Di Wang +3

Revenue-optimal auction design is a challenging problem with significant theoretical and practical implications. Sequential auction mechanisms, known for their simplicity and stron…

cs.GT2023★ 4 cited

Data Market Design through Deep Learning

Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes

The data market design problem is a problem in economic theory to find a set of signaling schemes (statistical experiments) to maximize expected revenue to the information seller,…

cs.GT2021

Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching

Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, Zhe Feng, Shira Li +3

We initiate the study of deep learning for the automated design of two-sided matching mechanisms. What is of most interest is to use machine learning to understand the possibility…

cs.LG2020★ 3 cited

From Predictions to Decisions: Using Lookahead Regularization

Nir Rosenfeld, Sophie Hilgard, Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath +1

Machine learning is a powerful tool for predicting human-related outcomes, from credit scores to heart attack risks. But when deployed, learned models also affect how users act in…

cs.GT2017★ 2 cited

Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning: Advances in Differentiable Economics

Paul Dütting, Zhe Feng, Harikrishna Narasimhan +2

Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is an intricate task. The single-item case was resolved in a seminal piece of work by Myerson in 1981, but…