43 citations · 83 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for
15 papers
Heterogeneous Noise and Stable Miscoordination
Srinivas Arigapudi, Yuval Heller, Amnon Schreiber
Coordination games admit two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where all players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, where players frequently experienc…
Social Media and Democracy
Ronen Gradwohl, Yuval Heller, Arye Hillman
We study the ability of a social media platform with a political agenda to influence voting outcomes. Our benchmark is Condorcet's jury theorem, which states that the likelihood of…
Mentors and Recombinators: Multi-Dimensional Social Learning
Srinivas Arigapudi, Omer Edhan, Yuval Heller +1
We study games in which the set of strategies is multi-dimensional, and new agents might learn various strategic dimensions from different mentors. We introduce a new family of dyn…
The Benefits of Coarse Preferences
Joseph Y. Halpern, Yuval Heller, Eyal Winter
We study the strategic advantages of coarsening one's utility by clustering nearby payoffs together (i.e., classifying them the same way). Our solution concept, coarse-utility equi…
Evolutionary Foundation for Heterogeneity in Risk Aversion
Yuval Heller, Ilan Nehama
We examine the evolutionary basis for risk aversion with respect to aggregate risk. We study populations in which agents face choices between alternatives with different levels of…
Sampling dynamics and stable mixing in hawk-dove games
Srinivas Arigapudi, Yuval Heller, Amnon Schreiber
The hawk-dove game admits two types of equilibria: an asymmetric pure equilibrium in which players in one population play hawk and players in the other population play dove, and an…
Naive analytics equilibrium
Ron Berman, Yuval Heller
We study interactions with uncertainty about demand sensitivity. In our solution concept (1) firms choose seemingly-optimal strategies given the level of sophistication of their da…
Observations on Cooperation
Yuval Heller, Erik Mohlin
We study environments in which agents are randomly matched to play a Prisoner's Dilemma, and each player observes a few of the partner's past actions against previous opponents. We…
A closed-form solution to the risk-taking motivation of subordinated debtholders
Yuval Heller, SharonPeleg-Lazar, Alon Raviv
Black and Cox (1976) claim that the value of junior debt is increasing in asset risk when the firm's value is low. We show, using closed-form solution, that the junior debt's value…
Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli
Yuval Heller, Erik Mohlin
We develop a framework in which individuals' preferences coevolve with their abilities to deceive others about their preferences and intentions. Specifically, individuals are chara…
Social Welfare in Search Games with Asymmetric Information
Gilad Bavly, Yuval Heller, Amnon Schreiber
We consider games in which players search for a hidden prize, and they have asymmetric information about the prize location. We study the social payoff in equilibria of these games…
Short-Term Investments and Indices of Risk
Yuval Heller, Amnon Schreiber
We study various decision problems regarding short-term investments in risky assets whose returns evolve continuously in time. We show that in each problem, all risk-averse decisio…
Instability of Defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma Under Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics
Srinivas Arigapudi, Yuval Heller, Igal Milchtaich
We study population dynamics under which each revising agent tests each strategy k times, with each trial being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose mean…
Evolution, Heritable Risk, and Skewness Loving
Yuval Heller, Arthur Robson
Our understanding of risk preferences can be sharpened by considering their evolutionary basis. The existing literature has focused on two sources of risk: idiosyncratic risk and a…
Communication, Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values
Yuval Heller, Christoph Kuzmics
An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-…