43 citations · 83 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for
15 papers
Heterogeneous Noise and Stable Miscoordination
Srinivas Arigapudi, Yuval Heller, Amnon Schreiber
Coordination games admit two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where all players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, where players frequently experienc…
Social Media and Democracy
Ronen Gradwohl, Yuval Heller, Arye Hillman
We study the ability of a social media platform with a political agenda to influence voting outcomes. Our benchmark is Condorcet's jury theorem, which states that the likelihood of…
Mentors and Recombinators: Multi-Dimensional Social Learning
Srinivas Arigapudi, Omer Edhan, Yuval Heller +1
We study games in which the set of strategies is multi-dimensional, and new agents might learn various strategic dimensions from different mentors. We introduce a new family of dyn…
The Benefits of Coarse Preferences
Joseph Y. Halpern, Yuval Heller, Eyal Winter
We study the strategic advantages of coarsening one's utility by clustering nearby payoffs together (i.e., classifying them the same way). Our solution concept, coarse-utility equi…
Evolutionary Foundation for Heterogeneity in Risk Aversion
Yuval Heller, Ilan Nehama
We examine the evolutionary basis for risk aversion with respect to aggregate risk. We study populations in which agents face choices between alternatives with different levels of…
Sampling dynamics and stable mixing in hawk-dove games
Srinivas Arigapudi, Yuval Heller, Amnon Schreiber
The hawk-dove game admits two types of equilibria: an asymmetric pure equilibrium in which players in one population play hawk and players in the other population play dove, and an…