1 citations · 2 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers · 1 filter
Computing Voting Rules with Elicited Incomplete Votes
Daniel Halpern, Safwan Hossain, Jamie Tucker-Foltz
Motivated by the difficulty of specifying complete ordinal preferences over a large set of candidates, we study voting rules that are computable by querying voters about $t < m…
On the Existence of Envy-Free Allocations Beyond Additive Valuations
Gerdus Benadè, Daniel Halpern, Alexandros Psomas +1
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible items among agents. Envy-free allocations, in which each agent prefers her bundle to the bundle of every other agent,…
Representation with Incomplete Votes
Daniel Halpern, Gregory Kehne, Ariel D. Procaccia +2
Platforms for online civic participation rely heavily on methods for condensing thousands of comments into a relevant handful, based on whether participants agree or disagree with…
Can Buyers Reveal for a Better Deal?
Daniel Halpern, Gregory Kehne, Jamie Tucker-Foltz
We study market interactions in which buyers are allowed to credibly reveal partial information about their types to the seller. Previous recent work has studied the special case o…
Fair and Efficient Resource Allocation with Partial Information
Daniel Halpern, Nisarg Shah
We study the fundamental problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents with additive preferences. We consider eliciting from each agent only a ranking of her most preferred…
Fair Division with Binary Valuations: One Rule to Rule Them All
Daniel Halpern, Ariel D. Procaccia, Alexandros Psomas +1
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents. Prior research focuses on additive agent preferences, which leads to an impossibility when seeking truthfulness, fairnes…
Resolving the Optimal Metric Distortion Conjecture
Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Halpern, Nisarg Shah
We study the following metric distortion problem: there are two finite sets of points, and , that lie in the same metric space, and our goal is to choose a point in whos…