111 citations · 324 across the 21 of their papers we have counts for
28 papers
Time Is Money: Incentivized Causal Transaction Ordering
Hongyin Chen, Xu Zheng, Jichen Li +1
Front-running is a subtle and persistent problem for blockchains. A blockchain is a stateful virtual machine executing instructions called transactions. Users earn rewards by publi…
Crypto x AI, AI x Crypto: A Survey
Sarah Allen, Pranay Anchuri, James Austgen +22
The intersection of crypto x AI is spawning papers, products, online posts, and companies. All the surrounding buzz, though, obscures what exactly has been done, what the opportuni…
Resilient Alerting Protocols for Blockchains
Marwa Mouallem, Lorenz Breidenbach, Ittay Eyal +1
Smart contracts are stateful programs deployed on blockchains; they secure over a trillion dollars in transaction value per year. High-stakes smart contracts often rely on timely a…
Fast Deterministically Safe Proof-of-Work Consensus
Ali Farahbakhsh, Giuliano Losa, Youer Pu +2
Permissionless blockchains achieve consensus while allowing unknown nodes to join and leave the system at any time. They typically come in two flavors: proof of work (PoW) and proo…
MAD-DAG: Protecting Blockchain Consensus from MEV
Roi Bar-Zur, Aviv Tamar, Ittay Eyal
Blockchain security is threatened by selfish mining, where a miner (operator) deviates from the protocol to increase their revenue. Selfish mining is exacerbated by adverse conditi…
Prrr: Personal Random Rewards for Blockchain Reporting
Hongyin Chen, Yubin Ke, Xiaotie Deng +1
Smart contracts, the stateful programs running on blockchains, often rely on reports. Publishers are paid to publish these reports on the blockchain. Designing protocols that incen…
Elastic Restaking Networks
Roi Bar-Zur, Ittay Eyal
Many blockchain-based decentralized services require their validators (operators) to deposit stake (collateral), which is forfeited (slashed) if they misbehave. Restaking networks…
Leveraging Bitcoin Mining Machines in Demand-Response Mechanisms to Mitigate Ramping-Induced Transients
Elinor Ginzburg-Ganz, Ittay Eyal, Ram Machlev +4
We propose an extended demand response program, based on ancillary service for supplying flexible electricity demand. In our proposed scheme, we suggest a broader management model…
Aegis: Tethering a Blockchain with Primary-Chain Stake
Yogev Bar-On, Roi Bar-Zur, Omer Ben-Porat +3
Blockchains implement decentralized monetary systems and applications. Recent advancements enable what we call tethering a blockchain to a primary blockchain, securing the tethered…
SAMM: Sharded Automated Market Maker
Hongyin Chen, Amit Vaisman, Ittay Eyal
The central challenge in addressing the security-performance trade-off in blockchain systems has moved from consensus protocols to enabling parallel execution. Various smart contra…
Asynchronous Authentication
Marwa Mouallem, Ittay Eyal
A myriad of authentication mechanisms embody a continuous evolution from verbal passwords in ancient times to contemporary multi-factor authentication. Nevertheless, digital asset…
Colordag: An Incentive-Compatible Blockchain
Ittai Abraham, Danny Dolev, Ittay Eyal +1
We present Colordag, a blockchain protocol where following the prescribed strategy is, with high probability, a best response as long as all miners have less than 1/2 of the mining…
Gorilla: Safe Permissionless Byzantine Consensus
Youer Pu, Ali Farahbakhsh, Lorenzo Alvisi +1
Nakamoto's consensus protocol works in a permissionless model and tolerates Byzantine failures, but only offers probabilistic agreement. Recently, the Sandglass protocol has shown…
Phoenix: A Formally Verified Regenerating Vault
Uri Kirstein, Shelly Grossman, Michael Mirkin +3
An attacker that gains access to a cryptocurrency user's private keys can perform any operation in her stead. Due to the decentralized nature of most cryptocurrencies, no entity ca…
Efficient MDP Analysis for Selfish-Mining in Blockchains
Roi Bar-Zur, Ittay Eyal, Aviv Tamar
A proof of work (PoW) blockchain protocol distributes rewards to its participants, called miners, according to their share of the total computational power. Sufficiently large mine…
MAD-HTLC: Because HTLC is Crazy-Cheap to Attack
Itay Tsabary, Matan Yechieli, Alex Manuskin +1
Smart Contracts and transactions allow users to implement elaborate constructions on cryptocurrency blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum. Many of these constructions, including op…
Multi-Party Timed Commitments
Yael Doweck, Ittay Eyal
The problem of obtaining secret commitments from multiple parties and revealing them after a certain time is useful for sealed-bid auctions, games, and other applications. Existing…
BDoS: Blockchain Denial of Service
Michael Mirkin, Yan Ji, Jonathan Pang +3
Proof-of-work (PoW) cryptocurrency blockchains like Bitcoin secure vast amounts of money. Their operators, called miners, expend resources to generate blocks and receive monetary r…
Tuning PoW with Hybrid Expenditure
Itay Tsabary, Alexander Spiegelman, Ittay Eyal
Proof of Work (PoW) is a Sybil-deterrence security mechanism. It introduces an external cost to a system by requiring computational effort to perform actions. However, since its in…
Ostraka: Secure Blockchain Scaling by Node Sharding
Alex Manuskin, Michael Mirkin, Ittay Eyal
Cryptocurrencies, implemented with blockchain protocols, promise to become a global payment system if they can overcome performance limitations. Rapidly advancing architectures imp…
The Gap Game
Itay Tsabary, Ittay Eyal
Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies secure a decentralized consensus protocol by incentives. The protocol participants, called miners, generate (mine) a series of blocks, each contai…
Decentralization in Bitcoin and Ethereum Networks
Adem Efe Gencer, Soumya Basu, Ittay Eyal +2
Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies have demonstrated how to securely implement traditionally centralized systems, such as currencies, in a decentralized fashion. However, there have…
Teechain: A Secure Payment Network with Asynchronous Blockchain Access
Joshua Lind, Oded Naor, Ittay Eyal +3
Blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum execute payment transactions securely, but their performance is limited by the need for global consensus. Payment networks overcome this li…
Teechan: Payment Channels Using Trusted Execution Environments
Joshua Lind, Ittay Eyal, Peter Pietzuch +1
Blockchain protocols are inherently limited in transaction throughput and latency. Recent efforts to address performance and scale blockchains have focused on off-chain payment cha…