3 citations · 7 across the 13 of their papers we have counts for
16 papers · 1 filter
EFX Allocation In (Multi)Hypergraphs
Thanasis Lianeas, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Minas Marios Sotiriou
We study fair allocations of indivisible goods among agents with heterogeneous monotone valuations. As fair we consider the allocations that are envy-free-up-to-any-good (EFX). Fin…
Almost EFX in Hypergraphs
Ioannis Kakatelis, Thanasis Lianeas, Alkmini Sgouritsa +1
We study the existence of envy-free-up-to-any-good (EFX) allocations of indivisible goods among agents with heterogeneous monotone valuations. Christodoulou et al. (2023) introduce…
Improving the Price of Anarchy via Predictions in Parallel-Link Networks
George Christodoulou, Vasilis Christoforidis, Alkmini Sgouritsa +1
We study non-atomic congestion games on parallel-link networks with affine cost functions. We investigate the power of machine-learned predictions in the design of coordination mec…
On the existence of EFX allocations in multigraphs
Alkmini Sgouritsa, Minas Marios Sotiriou
We study the problem of "fairly" dividing indivisible goods to several agents that have valuation set functions over the sets of goods. As fair we consider the allocations that are…
Maximin Share Guarantees for Few Agents with Subadditive Valuations
George Christodoulou, Vasilis Christoforidis, Symeon Mastrakoulis +1
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items among a set of agents. We consider the notion of (approximate) maximin share (MMS) and we provide an improved l…
EF2X Exists For Four Agents
Arash Ashuri, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alkmini Sgouritsa
We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods among a group of agents, aiming to limit the envy between any two agents. The central open problem in this literature, which has p…
Mechanism design augmented with output advice
George Christodoulou, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Ioannis Vlachos
Our work revisits the design of mechanisms via the learning-augmented framework. In this model, the algorithm is enhanced with imperfect (machine-learned) information concerning th…
Pushing the Frontier on Approximate EFX Allocations
Georgios Amanatidis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alkmini Sgouritsa
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of agents with additive valuation functions, aiming to achieve approximate envy-freeness up to any good (-…
Improved Price of Anarchy via Predictions
Vasilis Gkatzelis, Kostas Kollias, Alkmini Sgouritsa +1
A central goal in algorithmic game theory is to analyze the performance of decentralized multiagent systems, like communication and information networks. In the absence of a centra…
Resource-Aware Cost-Sharing Mechanisms with Priors
Vasilis Gkatzelis, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Alkmini Sgouritsa
In a decentralized system with machines, we study the selfish scheduling problem where each user strategically chooses which machine to use. Each machine incurs a cost, which i…
Resource-Aware Protocols for Network Cost-Sharing Games
George Christodoulou, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Mohamad Latifian +1
We study the extent to which decentralized cost-sharing protocols can achieve good price of anarchy (PoA) bounds in network cost-sharing games with agents. We focus on the mode…
A Little Charity Guarantees Almost Envy-Freeness
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Tellikepalli Kavitha, Kurt Mehlhorn +1
Fair division of indivisible goods is a very well-studied problem. The goal of this problem is to distribute goods to agents in a "fair" manner, where every agent has a val…
On the Efficiency of All-Pay Mechanisms
George Christodoulou, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Bo Tang
We study the inefficiency of mixed equilibria, expressed as the price of anarchy, of all-pay auctions in three different environments: combinatorial, multi-unit and single-item auc…
On the Efficiency of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism for Divisible Resources
George Christodoulou, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Bo Tang
We study the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism, that is widely used to allocate divisible resources. Each agent submits a bid for each divisible resource and rece…
Designing Networks with Good Equilibria under Uncertainty
George Christodoulou, Alkmini Sgouritsa
We consider the problem of designing network cost-sharing protocols with good equilibria under uncertainty. The underlying game is a multicast game in a rooted undirected graph wit…
Tight Bounds for the Price of Anarchy of Simultaneous First Price Auctions
George Christodoulou, Annamária Kovács, Alkmini Sgouritsa +1
We study the Price of Anarchy of simultaneous first-price auctions for buyers with submodular and subadditive valuations. The current best upper bounds for the Bayesian Price of An…