Rian Neogi

activity

20182025

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cs.GT2025

Multidimensional Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design

Rian Neogi, Kanstantsin Pashkovich, Chaitanya Swamy

In budget-feasible mechanism design, a buyer wishes to procure a set of items of maximum value from self-interested players. We have a valuation function $v : 2^{U} \to R_{+}$ ,…

cs.GT2025

An $O (lo g lo g n)$ -approximate budget feasible mechanism for subadditive valuations

Rian Neogi, Kanstantsin Pashkovich, Chaitanya Swamy

In budget-feasible mechanism design, there is a set of items $U$ , each owned by a distinct seller. The seller of item $e$ incurs a private cost $c_{e}$ for supplying her i…

Multidimensional Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design

An O(loglogn)-approximate budget feasible mechanism for subadditive valuations

An $O (lo g lo g n)$ -approximate budget feasible mechanism for subadditive valuations