9 citations · 17 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers
An Axiomatic Decomposition of Strategyproofness for Ordinal Mechanism with Indifferences
Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken
We study mechanism which operate on ordinal preference information (i.e., rank ordered lists of alternatives) on the full domain of weak preferences that admits indifferences. We p…
Two New Impossibility Results for the Random Assignment Problem
Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken
In this note, we prove two new impossibility results for random assignment mechanisms: Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) showed that no assignment mechanism can satisfy strategyproofne…
Local Sufficiency for Partial Strategyproofness
Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken
In (Mennle and Seuken, 2017), we have introduced partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness, to study the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assig…
The Pareto Frontier for Random Mechanisms
Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken
We study the trade-offs between strategyproofness and other desiderata, such as efficiency or fairness, that often arise in the design of random ordinal mechanisms. We use approxim…
Trade-offs in School Choice: Comparing Deferred Acceptance, the Naive and the Classic Boston Mechanism
Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken
The three most common school choice mechanisms are the Deferred Acceptance mechanism (DA), the classic Boston mechanism (BM), and a variant of the Boston mechanism where students a…
Partial Strategyproofness: Relaxing Strategyproofness for the Random Assignment Problem
Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken
We present partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness for studying the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. Informally, a mec…