3 citations · 3 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
cs.GT2020
An Axiomatic Decomposition of Strategyproofness for Ordinal Mechanism with Indifferences
Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken
We study mechanism which operate on ordinal preference information (i.e., rank ordered lists of alternatives) on the full domain of weak preferences that admits indifferences. We p…
cs.GT2020★ 3 cited
Two New Impossibility Results for the Random Assignment Problem
Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken
In this note, we prove two new impossibility results for random assignment mechanisms: Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) showed that no assignment mechanism can satisfy strategyproofne…
cs.GT2020
Local Sufficiency for Partial Strategyproofness
Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken
In (Mennle and Seuken, 2017), we have introduced partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness, to study the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assig…