3 citations · 3 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers
Pricing Optimal Outcomes in Coupled and Non-Convex Markets: Theory and Applications to Electricity Markets
Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Martin Bichler, Johannes Knörr
According to the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, any competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient. Unfortunately, competitive equilibrium prices only exist under strong a…
Improved Two Sample Revenue Guarantees via Mixed-Integer Linear Programming
Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta
We study the performance of the Empirical Revenue Maximizing (ERM) mechanism in a single-item, single-seller, single-buyer setting. We assume the buyer's valuation is drawn from a…
The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions
Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta
We study the efficiency of sequential multiunit auctions with two-buyers and complete information. For general valuation functions, we show that the price of anarchy is exactly $1/…
Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions with No Overbidding
Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Brendan Lucier, Adrian Vetta
We study equilibria in two-buyer sequential second-price (or first-price) auctions for identical goods. Buyers have weakly decreasing incremental values, and we make a behavioural…