3 papers
cs.GT2021
Improved Two Sample Revenue Guarantees via Mixed-Integer Linear Programming
Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta
We study the performance of the Empirical Revenue Maximizing (ERM) mechanism in a single-item, single-seller, single-buyer setting. We assume the buyer's valuation is drawn from a…
cs.GT2020
The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions
Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta
We study the efficiency of sequential multiunit auctions with two-buyers and complete information. For general valuation functions, we show that the price of anarchy is exactly $1/…
cs.GT2020
Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions with No Overbidding
Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Brendan Lucier, Adrian Vetta
We study equilibria in two-buyer sequential second-price (or first-price) auctions for identical goods. Buyers have weakly decreasing incremental values, and we make a behavioural…