3 citations · 6 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
12 papers
Enabling Trade-offs in Machine Learning-based Matching for Refugee Resettlement
Nils Olberg, Sven Seuken
The Swiss State Secretariat for Migration recently announced a pilot project for a machine learning-based assignment process for refugee resettlement. This approach has the potenti…
Shapley-Based Core-Selecting Payment Rules
Vitor Bosshard, Sven Seuken
In this research note, we lay some groundwork for analyzing the manipulability of core-selecting payment rules in combinatorial auctions. In particular, we focus on payment rules b…
The Cost of Simple Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions
Vitor Bosshard, Sven Seuken
We study a class of manipulations in combinatorial auctions where bidders fundamentally misrepresent what goods they are interested in. Prior work has largely assumed that bidders…
Revenue Maximization for Consumer Software: Subscription or Perpetual License?
Ludwig Dierks, Sven Seuken
We study the revenue maximization problem of a publisher selling consumer software. We assume that the publisher sells either traditional perpetual licenses, subscription licenses,…
An Axiomatic Decomposition of Strategyproofness for Ordinal Mechanism with Indifferences
Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken
We study mechanism which operate on ordinal preference information (i.e., rank ordered lists of alternatives) on the full domain of weak preferences that admits indifferences. We p…
Two New Impossibility Results for the Random Assignment Problem
Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken
In this note, we prove two new impossibility results for random assignment mechanisms: Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) showed that no assignment mechanism can satisfy strategyproofne…