3 papers
econ.TH2020
Robust Sequential Search
Karl H. Schlag, Andriy Zapechelnyuk
We study sequential search without priors. Our interest lies in decision rules that are close to being optimal under each prior and after each history. We call these rules dynamica…
econ.TH2020
Compromise, Don't Optimize: Generalizing Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium to Allow for Ambiguity
Karl Schlag, Andriy Zapechelnyuk
We introduce a solution concept for extensive-form games of incomplete information in which players need not assign likelihoods to what they do not know about the game. This is emb…
econ.TH2019
Persuasion Meets Delegation
Anton Kolotilin, Andriy Zapechelnyuk
A principal can restrict an agent's information (the persuasion problem) or restrict an agent's discretion (the delegation problem). We show that these problems are generally equiv…