3 papers
econ.TH2020
Geometry of anonymous binary social choices that are strategy-proof
Achille Basile, Surekha Rao, K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao
Let be society whose members express preferences about two alternatives, indifference included. Identifying anonymous binary social choice functions with binary functions $f=f(…
econ.TH2020
Anonymous, non-manipulable, binary social choice
Achille Basile, Surekha Rao, K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao
Let V be a finite society whose members express weak orderings (hence also indifference, possibly) about two alternatives. We show a simple representation formula that is valid for…
econ.TH2020
The structure of two-valued strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference
Achille Basile, Surekha Rao, K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao
We give a structure theorem for all coalitionally strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is a subset of cardinality two of a given larger set of alternatives. We provid…