activity
20092026
most citedRegularity of the minmax value and equilibria in multiplayer Blackwell games

2 citations · 4 across the 17 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

21 papers

math.OC2026

Optimal strategies in Markov decision processes with finitely additive evaluations

János Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski, William D Sudderth +1

We study infinite-horizon Markov decision processes (MDPs) where the decision maker evaluates each of her strategies by aggregating the infinite stream of expected stage-rewards. T…

math.OC2025

Games with infinite past

Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, János Flesch, Eilon Solan

We study multi-player games with perfect information and general payoff function, where the set of stages is the set of non-positive integers . We define two re…

econ.TH2025

A general definition of perfect equilibrium

János Flesch, Christopher Kops, Dries Vermeulen +1

We propose a general definition of perfect equilibrium which is applicable to a wide class of games. A key feature is the concept of completely mixed nets of strategies, based on a…

math.PR2024

Approximations of expectations under infinite product measures

Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, János Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski +1

We are given a bounded Borel-measurable real-valued function on a product of countably many Polish spaces, and a product probability measure. We are interested in points in the pro…

math.OC2024

Zero-one Laws for a Control Problem with Random Action Sets

János Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski, William D Sudderth +1

In many control problems there is only limited information about the actions that will be available at future stages. We introduce a framework where the Controller chooses actions…

math.OC2022★ 1 cited

Stochastic Games with General Payoff Functions

János Flesch, Eilon Solan

We consider multiplayer stochastic games in which the payoff of each player is a bounded and Borel-measurable function of the infinite play. By using a generalization of the techni…

math.OC2022

Absorbing Blackwell Games

Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, János Flesch, Eilon Solan

It was shown in Flesch and Solan (2022) with a rather involved proof that all two-player stochastic games with finite state and action spaces and shift-invariant payoffs admit an $…

math.OC2022★ 1 cited

Repeated Games with Tail-Measurable Payoffs

János Flesch, Eilon Solan

We study multiplayer Blackwell games, which are repeated games where the payoff of each player is a bounded and Borel-measurable function of the infinite stream of actions played b…

math.OC2022

Equilibrium in Two-Player Stochastic Games with Shift-Invariant Payoffs

János Flesch, Eilon Solan

We show that every two-player stochastic game with finite state and action sets and bounded, Borel-measurable, and shift-invariant payoffs, admits an $\ep$-equilibrium for all $\va…

math.OC2022★ 2 cited

Regularity of the minmax value and equilibria in multiplayer Blackwell games

Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, János Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski +1

A real-valued function that is defined over all Borel sets of a topological space is \emph{regular} if for every Borel set , is the supremum of , over all close…

math.OC2021

Equilibria in Repeated Games with Countably Many Players and Tail-Measurable Payoffs

Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Janos Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski +1

We prove that every repeated game with countably many players, finite action sets, and tail-measurable payoffs admits an -equilibrium, for every .

cs.GT2021

Random perfect information games

János Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski, Ville Suomala

The paper proposes a natural measure space of zero-sum perfect information games with upper semicontinuous payoffs. Each game is specified by the game tree, and by the assignment o…

math.GN2020

Games characterizing limsup functions and Baire class 1 functions

Márton Elekes, János Flesch, Viktor Kiss +3

We consider a real-valued function defined on the set of infinite branches of a countably branching pruned tree . The function is said to be a \textit{limsup functio…

cs.GT2020

A competitive search game with a moving target

Benoit Duvocelle, János Flesch, Mathias Staudigl +1

We introduce a discrete-time search game, in which two players compete to find an object first. The object moves according to a time-varying Markov chain on finitely many states. T…

math.OC2020

Search for a moving target in a competitive environment

Benoit Duvocelle, János Flesch, Hui Min Shi +1

We consider a discrete-time dynamic search game in which a number of players compete to find an invisible object that is moving according to a time-varying Markov chain. We examine…

cs.GT2020

Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games

Aditya Aradhye, János Flesch, Mathias Staudigl +1

We introduce a model of sender-receiver stopping games, where the state of the world follows an iid--process throughout the game. At each period, the sender observes the current st…

math.OC2019

Reachability and safety objectives in Markov decision processes on long but finite horizons

Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, János Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski +1

We consider discrete-time Markov decision processes in which the decision maker is interested in long but finite horizons. First we consider reachability objective: the decision ma…

math.GN2019

The doubling metric and doubling measures

János Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski, Ville Suomala

We introduce the so--called doubling metric on the collection of non--empty bounded open subsets of a metric space. Given a subset of a metric space , the predecessor $U_{*}…

cs.GT2016

Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games

János Flesch, Rida Laraki, Vianney Perchet

We consider Blackwell approachability, a very powerful and geometric tool in game theory, used for example to design strategies of the uninformed player in repeated games with inco…

cs.GT2014

Existence of Secure Equilibrium in Multi-Player Games with Perfect Information

Julie De Pril, János Flesch, Jeroen Kuipers +2

Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response s…

math.PR2009

Borel Games with Lower-Semi-Continuous Payoffs

Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi, Eilon Solan

We prove that every two-player non-zero-sum Borel game with lower-semi-continuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect $\ep$-equilibrium. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and…