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20142025
most citedToward Trustworthy AI Development: Mechanisms for Supporting Verifiable Claims

219 citations · 263 across the 14 of their papers we have counts for

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7 papers · 1 filter

cs.CR2025

Defending Against Intelligent Attackers at Large Scales

Andrew J. Lohn

We investigate the scale of attack and defense mathematically in the context of AI's possible effect on cybersecurity. For a given target today, highly scaled cyber attacks such as…

cs.CR2025

The Impact of AI on the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance and the Character of Cyber Conflict

Andrew J. Lohn

Unlike other domains of conflict, and unlike other fields with high anticipated risk from AI, the cyber domain is intrinsically digital with a tight feedback loop between AI traini…

cs.CR2023★ 11 cited

Adversarial Machine Learning and Cybersecurity: Risks, Challenges, and Legal Implications

Micah Musser, Andrew Lohn, James X. Dempsey +14

In July 2022, the Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) at Georgetown University and the Program on Geopolitics, Technology, and Governance at the Stanford Cyber Polic…

cs.CR2022★ 1 cited

Will AI Make Cyber Swords or Shields: A few mathematical models of technological progress

Andrew J Lohn, Krystal Alex Jackson

We aim to demonstrate the value of mathematical models for policy debates about technological progress in cybersecurity by considering phishing, vulnerability discovery, and the dy…

cs.CR2020★ 1 cited

Downscaling Attack and Defense: Turning What You See Back Into What You Get

Andrew J. Lohn

The resizing of images, which is typically a required part of preprocessing for computer vision systems, is vulnerable to attack. Images can be created such that the image is compl…

cs.CR2019

Defense in Depth: The Basics of Blockade and Delay

Andrew J. Lohn

Given that individual defenses are rarely sufficient, defense-in-depth is nearly universal and options for individual defensive layers abound. We develop a simple mathematical theo…

cs.CR2018★ 1 cited

Timelines for In-Code Discovery of Zero-Day Vulnerabilities and Supply-Chain Attacks

Andrew J. Lohn

Zero-day vulnerabilities can be accidentally or maliciously placed in code and can remain in place for years. In this study, we address an aspect of their longevity by considering…