8 citations · 16 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for
12 papers
Trading with the STARS: Algorithm Design & Spectrum of Fundamental Limits for Trading with Storage
Jerry Anunrojwong, Akshit Kumar, Rachitesh Kumar
We study an online trading problem where a trader, given a sequence of i.i.d. prices drawn from a known distribution on , must make irrevocable buy, sell, or hold decisi…
Robust Scale-Free Auctions
Jerry Anunrojwong
We study prior-independent auction design when bidder values are independently and identically distributed and the seller knows only a scale-invariant shape restriction on their di…
Residential Battery Pooling Under Backup Commitments
Jerry Anunrojwong, Baosen Zhang
Residential batteries increasingly serve two roles: they can earn money by arbitraging wholesale prices and providing grid services, and they provide backup power during outages. T…
Battery Operations in Electricity Markets: Strategic Behavior and Distortions
Jerry Anunrojwong, Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes +1
Battery storage can reduce electricity generation costs by shifting energy across time, but as privately owned batteries become large, they may also be able to exert market power.…
The Best of Many Robustness Criteria in Decision Making: Formulation and Application to Robust Pricing
Jerry Anunrojwong, Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes
In robust decision-making under non-Bayesian uncertainty, different robust optimization criteria, such as maximin performance, minimax regret, and maximin ratio, have been proposed…
Robust Auction Design with Support Information
Jerry Anunrojwong, Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes
A seller wants to sell an item to buyers. Buyer valuations are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution unknown to the seller; the seller only knows that the support is included in $[a…
Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach
Jerry Anunrojwong, Krishnamurthy Iyer, David Lingenbrink
We consider a persuasion problem between a sender and a receiver whose utility may be nonlinear in her belief; we call such receivers risk-conscious. Such utility models arise when…
On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design
Jerry Anunrojwong, Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes
Classical Bayesian mechanism design relies on the common prior assumption, but such prior is often not available in practice. We study the design of prior-independent mechanisms th…
Social Learning under Platform Influence: Consensus and Persistent Disagreement
Ozan Candogan, Nicole Immorlica, Bar Light +1
Individuals increasingly rely on social networking platforms to form opinions. However, these platforms typically aim to maximize engagement, which may not align with social good.…
Computing Equilibria of Prediction Markets via Persuasion
Jerry Anunrojwong, Yiling Chen, Bo Waggoner +1
We study the computation of equilibria in prediction markets in perhaps the most fundamental special case with two players and three trading opportunities. To do so, we show equiva…
Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion
Jerry Anunrojwong, Krishnamurthy Iyer, Vahideh Manshadi
We study the effectiveness of information design in reducing congestion in social services catering to users with varied levels of need. In the absence of price discrimination and…
Naive Bayesian Learning in Social Networks
Jerry Anunrojwong, Nat Sothanaphan
The DeGroot model of naive social learning assumes that agents only communicate scalar opinions. In practice, agents communicate not only their opinions, but their confidence in su…