4 papers
Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Prior
Modibo Camara, Jason Hartline, Aleck Johnsen
A rich class of mechanism design problems can be understood as incomplete-information games between a principal who commits to a policy and an agent who responds, with payoffs dete…
Benchmark Design and Prior-independent Optimization
Jason Hartline, Aleck Johnsen, Yingkai Li
This paper compares two leading approaches for robust optimization in the models of online algorithms and mechanism design. Competitive analysis compares the performance of an onli…
Dashboard Mechanisms for Online Marketplaces
Jason Hartline, Aleck Johnsen, Denis Nekipelov +1
This paper gives a theoretical model for design and analysis of mechanisms for online marketplaces where a bidding dashboard enables the bid-optimization of long-lived agents. We a…
Inference from Auction Prices
Jason Hartline, Aleck Johnsen, Denis Nekipelov +1
Econometric inference allows an analyst to back out the values of agents in a mechanism from the rules of the mechanism and bids of the agents. This paper gives an algorithm to sol…