3 papers
econ.TH2025★ 1 cited
Eliciting Informed Preferences
Modibo K. Camara, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier
In many settings -- like market research and social choice -- people may be presented with unfamiliar options. Classical mechanisms may perform poorly because they fail to incentiv…
cs.GT2023
Screening with Disadvantaged Agents
Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Modibo K. Camara, Jason Hartline +2
Motivated by school admissions, this paper studies screening in a population with both advantaged and disadvantaged agents. A school is interested in admitting the most skilled stu…
econ.TH2020
Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Prior
Modibo Camara, Jason Hartline, Aleck Johnsen
A rich class of mechanism design problems can be understood as incomplete-information games between a principal who commits to a policy and an agent who responds, with payoffs dete…