activity
20192023
most citedLow-cost attacks on Ethereum 2.0 by sub-1/3 stakeholders

16 citations · 21 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

6 papers

q-fin.MF2023

Triangle Fees

Rithvik Rao, Nihar Shah

Triangle fees are a novel fee structure for AMMs, in which marginal fees are decreasing in a trade's size. That decline is proportional to the movement in the AMM's implied price,…

cs.CR2021

Strategic Liquidity Provision in Uniswap v3

Zhou Fan, Francisco Marmolejo-Cossío, Daniel J. Moroz +3

Uniswap v3 is the largest decentralized exchange for digital currencies. A novelty of its design is that it allows a liquidity provider (LP) to allocate liquidity to one or more cl…

econ.TH2021★ 5 cited

Discord and Harmony in Networks

Andrea Galeotti, Benjamin Golub, Sanjeev Goyal +1

Consider a coordination game played on a network, where agents prefer taking actions closer to those of their neighbors and to their own ideal points in action space. We explore ho…

cs.CR2021★ 16 cited

Low-cost attacks on Ethereum 2.0 by sub-1/3 stakeholders

Michael Neuder, Daniel J. Moroz, Rithvik Rao +1

We outline two dishonest strategies that can be cheaply executed on the Ethereum 2.0 beacon chain, even by validators holding less than one-third of the total stake: malicious chai…

cs.CR2020

Defending Against Malicious Reorgs in Tezos Proof-of-Stake

Michael Neuder, Daniel J. Moroz, Rithvik Rao +1

Blockchains are intended to be immutable, so an attacker who is able to delete transactions through a chain reorganization (a malicious reorg) can perform a profitable double-spend…

cs.CR2019

Selfish Behavior in the Tezos Proof-of-Stake Protocol

Michael Neuder, Daniel J. Moroz, Rithvik Rao +1

Proof-of-Stake consensus protocols give rise to complex modeling challenges. We analyze the recently-updated Tezos Proof-of-Stake protocol and demonstrate that, under certain condi…