2 citations · 4 across the 13 of their papers we have counts for
16 papers
Two-sided Market Design Meets Autobidding
Yang Cai, Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta +2
Autobidding has become a dominant paradigm in online advertising by enabling advertisers to set high-level goals while algorithms handle real-time bid optimization. A prominent exa…
Approximately Efficient Multidimensional Bilateral Trade
Aviad Rubinstein, Xizhi Tan, Zixin Zhou
A central challenge in mechanism design is to develop truthful trade mechanisms that maximize the expected gains-from-trade (GFT) in two-sided markets. Because achieving the full G…
Forging Self-Funded Marketplaces among Strategic Agents
Yuan Deng, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan +2
We introduce the problem of designing mechanisms that incentivize strategic agents to form self-funded marketplaces. In our model, if agent exerts effort , they i…
Learning Distributions from Multiple Data Providers
Jon Kleinberg, Amin Saberi, Xizhi Tan +1
Motivated by learning from heterogeneous and overlapping data providers, we study a stylized model of distribution learning from restricted conditional samples. The goal is to lear…
Approximating Gains-from-Trade in Matching Markets
Moshe Babaioff, Aviad Rubinstein, Xizhi Tan +1
A central challenge in mechanism design is to develop truthful trade mechanisms that maximize the expected gains-from-trade (GFT) in two-sided markets with strategic agents. As ach…
Procurement Auctions with Predictions: Improved Frugality for Facility Location
Eric Balkanski, Nicholas DeFilippis, Vasilis Gkatzelis +1
We study the problem of designing procurement auctions for the strategic uncapacitated facility location problem: a company needs to procure a set of facility locations in order to…
Clock Auctions Augmented with Unreliable Advice
Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan
We provide the first analysis of (deferred acceptance) clock auctions in the learning-augmented framework. These auctions satisfy a unique list of appealing properties, including o…
Online Mechanism Design with Predictions
Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan +1
Aiming to overcome some of the limitations of worst-case analysis, the recently proposed framework of "algorithms with predictions" allows algorithms to be augmented with a (possib…
Learning-Augmented Metric Distortion via -Veto Core
Ben Berger, Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis +1
In the metric distortion problem there is a set of candidates and voters in the same metric space. The goal is to select a candidate minimizing the social cost: the sum of…
Getting More by Knowing Less: Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Fair Division
Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Xizhi Tan +1
We study fair resource allocation with strategic agents. It is well-known that, across multiple fundamental problems in this domain, truthfulness and fairness are incompatible. For…
EFx Budget-Feasible Allocations with High Nash Welfare
Marius Garbea, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan
We study the problem of allocating indivisible items to budget-constrained agents, aiming to provide fairness and efficiency guarantees. Specifically, our goal is to ensure that th…
Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions
Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan
In their seminal paper that initiated the field of algorithmic mechanism design, \citet{NR99} studied the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for scheduling jobs on unrel…
Improved Price of Anarchy via Predictions
Vasilis Gkatzelis, Kostas Kollias, Alkmini Sgouritsa +1
A central goal in algorithmic game theory is to analyze the performance of decentralized multiagent systems, like communication and information networks. In the absence of a centra…
Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location
Priyank Agrawal, Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis +2
In this work we introduce an alternative model for the design and analysis of strategyproof mechanisms that is motivated by the recent surge of work in "learning-augmented algorith…
Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions
Eric Balkanski, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis +2
We revisit the well-studied problem of budget-feasible procurement, where a buyer with a strict budget constraint seeks to acquire services from a group of strategic providers (the…
Fair and Efficient Online Allocations with Normalized Valuations
Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Xizhi Tan
A set of divisible resources becomes available over a sequence of rounds and needs to be allocated immediately and irrevocably. Our goal is to distribute these resources to maximiz…