2 citations · 3 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers
Incomplete Information Robustness
Stephen Morris, Takashi Ui
Consider an analyst who models a strategic situation using an incomplete information game. The true game may involve correlated, duplicated belief hierarchies, but the analyst lack…
The Optimality of Constant Mark-Up Pricing
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann, Stephen Morris
We consider a nonlinear pricing environment with private information. We provide profit guarantees (and associated mechanisms) that the seller can achieve across all possible distr…
Screening with Persuasion
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann, Stephen Morris
We analyze a nonlinear pricing model where the seller controls both product pricing (screening) and buyer information about their own values (persuasion). We prove that the optimal…
Expectations, Networks, and Conventions
Benjamin Golub, Stephen Morris
In coordination games and speculative over-the-counter financial markets, solutions depend on higher-order average expectations: agents' expectations about what counterparties, on…