1 citations · 1 across the 2 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers
Constrained Reinforcement Learning via Dissipative Saddle Flow Dynamics
Tianqi Zheng, Pengcheng You, Enrique Mallada
In constrained reinforcement learning (C-RL), an agent seeks to learn from the environment a policy that maximizes the expected cumulative reward while satisfying minimum requireme…
A Market Mechanism for Truthful Bidding with Energy Storage
Rajni Kant Bansal, Pengcheng You, Dennice F. Gayme +1
This paper proposes a market mechanism for multi-interval electricity markets with generator and storage participants. Drawing ideas from supply function bidding, we introduce a no…
Mechanism Design for Efficient Nash Equilibrium in Oligopolistic Markets
Kaiying Lin, Beibei Wang, Pengcheng You
This paper investigates the efficiency loss in social cost caused by strategic bidding behavior of individual participants in a supply-demand balancing market, and proposes a mecha…
Storage Degradation Aware Economic Dispatch
R. K. Bansal, P. You, D. F. Gayme +1
In this paper, we formulate a cycling cost aware economic dispatch problem that co-optimizes generation and storage dispatch while taking into account cycle based storage degradati…
Saddle Flow Dynamics: Observable Certificates and Separable Regularization
Pengcheng You, Enrique Mallada
This paper proposes a certificate, rooted in observability, for asymptotic convergence of saddle flow dynamics of convex-concave functions to a saddle point. This observable certif…
The Role of Strategic Load Participants in Two-Stage Settlement Electricity Markets
Pengcheng You, Dennice F. Gayme, Enrique Mallada
Two-stage electricity market clearing is designed to maintain market efficiency under ideal conditions, e.g., perfect forecast and nonstrategic generation. This work demonstrates t…