activity
19962026
most citedComputationally Feasible VCG Mechanisms

148 citations · 863 across the 50 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

62 papers

cs.GT2026

Domination-Avoiding Learning Agents Cannot Collude

Noam Nisan, Emmanuel Zerah

An influential paper of Calvano et al. empirically demonstrated that Q-learning agents spontaneously collude when placed as sellers that compete on prices in a natural market model…

cs.GT2026

Existence of Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods: An Elementary Proof

Sergiu Hart, Noam Nisan

We provide an elementary proof that revenue-maximizing mechanisms exist in multi-parameter settings whenever the distribution of valuations has finite expectation.

cs.CC2025

Complexity of Unambiguous Problems in

Matan Gilboa, Paul W. Goldberg, Elias Koutsoupias +1

Various practical problems within the class possess an unambiguity property, meaning that yes-instances correspond with a unique witness. The semantic class containing al…

cs.GT2025

The Root of Revenue Continuity

Sergiu Hart, Noam Nisan

In the setup of selling one or more goods, various papers have shown, in various forms and for various purposes, that a small change in the distribution of a buyer's valuations may…

cs.DS2025

Online Block Packing and Multidimensional EIP-1559

Ariel Ben Eliezer, Noam Nisan

We consider the online algorithmic challenge that is faced by blockchains that have multidimensional block constraints and serve quasi-patient bidders. We first provide online appr…

cs.GT2025

Does Your Blockchain Need Multidimensional Transaction Fees?

Nir Lavee, Noam Nisan, Mallesh Pai +1

Blockchains have block-size limits to ensure the entire cluster can keep up with the tip of the chain. These block-size limits are usually single-dimensional, but richer multidimen…