auctions 1buyer constraints 1consumer surplus 1dynamic mechanism design 1optimal mechanism design 1optimal revenue and welfare 1rental games 1revenue maximization 1single-parameter auctions 1stagewise individual rationality 1
From the 2 of 2 linked papers with an AI index.
2 papers
cs.GT2026
Dynamic Rental Games with Stagewise Individual Rationality
Batya Berzack, Rotem Oshman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
The paper investigates dynamic mechanism design for renting a single asset over multiple days, focusing on agents who require stagewise individual rationality and deriving optimal…
cs.GT2026
Optimal Auction Design for Constrained Buyers
Batya Berzack, Rotem Oshman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
The paper studies optimal auction design when buyers face constraints on how they can bid or spend, showing that classic auction theory results break down and providing new optimal…