40 citations · 242 across the 33 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
Fairness and Incentive Compatibility via Percentage Fees
Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren, Jan Vondrak
We study incentive-compatible mechanisms that maximize the Nash Social Welfare. Since traditional incentive-compatible mechanisms cannot maximize the Nash Social Welfare even appro…
Estimating the Nash Social Welfare for coverage and other submodular valuations
Wenzheng Li, Jan Vondrak
We study the Nash Social Welfare problem: Given agents with valuation functions , partition into so as to maximize $…
When Are Welfare Guarantees Robust?
Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Jan Vondrák
Computational and economic results suggest that social welfare maximization and combinatorial auction design are much easier when bidders' valuations satisfy the "gross substitutes…
The Computational Complexity of Truthfulness in Combinatorial Auctions
Shahar Dobzinski, Jan Vondrak
One of the fundamental questions of Algorithmic Mechanism Design is whether there exists an inherent clash between truthfulness and computational tractability: in particular, wheth…
An approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanism for combinatorial auctions using value queries
Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden, Jan Vondrak +1
This manuscript presents an alternative implementation of the truthful-in-expectation mechanism of Dughmi, Roughgarden and Yan for combinatorial auctions with weighted-matroid-rank…