3 papers
cs.GT2024
Repeated Contracting with Multiple Non-Myopic Agents: Policy Regret and Limited Liability
Natalie Collina, Varun Gupta, Aaron Roth
We study a repeated contracting setting in which a Principal adaptively chooses amongst Agents at each of rounds. The Agents are non-myopic, and so a mechanism for the Prin…
cs.GT2024
Pareto-Optimal Algorithms for Learning in Games
Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran, Natalie Collina, Jon Schneider
We study the problem of characterizing optimal learning algorithms for playing repeated games against an adversary with unknown payoffs. In this problem, the first player (called t…
cs.GT2023
Efficient Prior-Free Mechanisms for No-Regret Agents
Natalie Collina, Aaron Roth, Han Shao
We study a repeated Principal Agent problem between a long lived Principal and Agent pair in a prior free setting. In our setting, the sequence of realized states of nature may be…