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cs.GT2025

Best of Both Worlds Guarantees for Equitable Allocations

Umang Bhaskar, Vishwa Prakash HV, Aditi Sethia +1

Equitability is a well-studied fairness notion in fair division, where an allocation is equitable if all agents receive equal utility from their allocation. For indivisible items,…

cs.GT2024

Connected Equitable Cake Division via Sperner's Lemma

Umang Bhaskar, A. R. Sricharan, Rohit Vaish

We study the problem of fair cake-cutting where each agent receives a connected piece of the cake. A division of the cake is deemed fair if it is equitable, which means that all ag…

cs.GT2024

Equilibrium Computation in the Hotelling-Downs Model of Spatial Competition

Umang Bhaskar, Soumyajit Pyne

The Hotelling-Downs model is a natural and appealing model for understanding strategic positioning by candidates in elections. In this model, voters are distributed on a line, repr…

cs.GT2024

EFX Allocations on Some Multi-graph Classes

Umang Bhaskar, Yeshwant Pandit

The existence of EFX allocations is one of the most significant open questions in fair division. Recent work by Christodolou, Fiat, Koutsoupias, and Sgouritsa ("Fair allocation in…

cs.GT2024

EF1 Allocations for Identical Trilean and Separable Single-Peaked Valuations

Umang Bhaskar, Gunjan Kumar, Yeshwant Pandit +1

In the fair division of items among interested agents, envy-freeness is possibly the most favoured and widely studied formalisation of fairness. For indivisible items, envy-free al…

cs.GT2024

Nearly Tight Bounds on Approximate Equilibria in Spatial Competition on the Line

Umang Bhaskar, Soumyajit Pyne

In Hotelling's model of spatial competition, a unit mass of voters is distributed in the interval (with their location corresponding to their political persuasion), and eac…