14 citations · 23 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
8 papers
Formally Modeling the Terrapin Attack on SSH
Jörg Schwenk, Fabian Bäumer, Marcus Brinkmann
The Terrapin attack against SSH channel integrity (USENIX Security 2024) used a novel attack vector: attacks on the channel state. Surprisingly, not all AEAD modes of SSH were equa…
Crossing the Streams: SSH Plaintext Recovery via a Common Compression Context in Multiplexed Channels
Fabian Bäumer, Marcus Brinkmann
SSH is the standard protocol for secure remote administration of servers. At the transport layer, SSH uses the Binary Packet Protocol (BPP) for encrypted and authenticated communic…
Finding SSH Strict Key Exchange Violations by State Learning
Fabian Bäumer, Marcel Maehren, Marcus Brinkmann +1
SSH is an important protocol for secure remote shell access to servers on the Internet. At USENIX 2024, Bäumer et al. presented the Terrapin attack on SSH, which relies on the atta…
On the Security of SSH Client Signatures
Fabian Bäumer, Marcus Brinkmann, Maximilian Radoy +2
Administrators and developers use SSH client keys and signatures for authentication, for example, to access internet backbone servers or to commit new code on platforms like GitHub…
Verde: Verification via Refereed Delegation for Machine Learning Programs
Arasu Arun, Adam St. Arnaud, Alexey Titov +6
Machine learning programs, such as those performing inference, fine-tuning, and training of LLMs, are commonly delegated to untrusted compute providers. To provide correctness guar…
Terrapin Attack: Breaking SSH Channel Integrity By Sequence Number Manipulation
Fabian Bäumer, Marcus Brinkmann, Jörg Schwenk
The SSH protocol provides secure access to network services, particularly remote terminal login and file transfer within organizational networks and to over 15 million servers on t…
Linearly Self-Equivalent APN Permutations in Small Dimension
Christof Beierle, Marcus Brinkmann, Gregor Leander
All almost perfect nonlinear (APN) permutations that we know to date admit a special kind of linear self-equivalence, i.e., there exists a permutation in their CCZ-equivalence…
Re: What's Up Johnny? -- Covert Content Attacks on Email End-to-End Encryption
Jens Müller, Marcus Brinkmann, Damian Poddebniak +2
We show practical attacks against OpenPGP and S/MIME encryption and digital signatures in the context of email. Instead of targeting the underlying cryptographic primitives, our at…