most citedEfficiency in Truthful Auctions via a Social Network

13 citations · 26 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

5 papers

cs.GT2024

Parameterized Voter Relevance in Facility Location Games with Tree-Shaped Invitation Graphs

Ryoto Ando, Kei Kimura, Taiki Todo +1

Diffusion mechanism design, which investigate how to incentivise agents to invite as many colleagues to a multi-agent decision making as possible, is a new research paradigm at the…

cs.GT2024

Analyzing Incentives and Fairness in Ordered Weighted Average for Facility Location Games

Kento Yoshida, Kei Kimura, Taiki Todo +1

Facility location games provide an abstract model of mechanism design. In such games, a mechanism takes a profile of single-peaked preferences over an interval as an input and…

cs.GT2019★ 6 cited

Strategy-Proof and Non-Wasteful Multi-Unit Auction via Social Network

Takehiro Kawasaki, Nathanael Barrot, Seiji Takanashi +2

Auctions via social network, pioneered by Li et al. (2017), have been attracting considerable attention in the literature of mechanism design for auctions. However, no known mechan…

cs.GT2019★ 7 cited

False-Name-Proof Facility Location on Discrete Structures

Taiki Todo, Nodoka Okada, Makoto Yokoo

We consider the problem of locating a single facility on a vertex in a given graph based on agents' preferences, where the domain of the preferences is either single-peaked or sing…

econ.TH2019★ 13 cited

Efficiency in Truthful Auctions via a Social Network

Seiji Takanashi, Takehiro Kawasaki, Taiki Todo +1

In this paper, we study efficiency in truthful auctions via a social network, where a seller can only spread the information of an auction to the buyers through the buyers' network…