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20182021
most citedIn Simple Communication Games, When Does Ex Ante Fact-Finding Benefit the Receiver?

2 citations · 2 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for

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Showing econ.THShow all

6 papers · 1 filter

econ.TH2021

Submission Fees in Risk-Taking Contests

Mark Whitmeyer

This paper investigates stochastic continuous time contests with a twist: the designer requires that contest participants incur some cost to submit their entries. When the designer…

econ.TH2021

Search and Competition with Flexible Investigations

Vasudha Jain, Mark Whitmeyer

We modify the standard model of price competition with horizontally differentiated products, imperfect information, and search frictions by allowing consumers to flexibly acquire i…

econ.TH2020

Persuasion Produces the (Diamond) Paradox

Mark Whitmeyer

This paper extends the sequential search model of Wolinsky (1986) by allowing firms to choose how much match value information to disclose to visiting consumers. This restores the…

econ.TH20202 cited

In Simple Communication Games, When Does Ex Ante Fact-Finding Benefit the Receiver?

Mark Whitmeyer

Always, if the number of states is equal to two; or if the number of receiver actions is equal to two and i. The number of states is three or fewer, or ii. The game is cheap talk,…

econ.TH2019

Competing to Persuade a Rationally Inattentive Agent

Vasudha Jain, Mark Whitmeyer

Firms strategically disclose product information in order to attract consumers, but recipients often find it costly to process all of it, especially when products have complex feat…

econ.TH2019

Mixtures of Mean-Preserving Contractions

Joseph Whitmeyer, Mark Whitmeyer

Given a purely atomic probability measure with support on n points, P, any mean-preserving contraction (mpc) of P, Q, with support on m > n points is a mixture of mpcs of P, each w…