activity
20172025
most citedLeaky Cauldron on the Dark Land: Understanding Memory Side-Channel Hazards in SGX

326 citations · 610 across the 13 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

13 papers

cs.CR2025

Characterizing Trust Boundary Vulnerabilities in TEE Containers: An Empirical Study

Weijie Liu, Hongbo Chen, Shuo Huai +7

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have become a cornerstone of confidential computing, attracting significant attention from academia and industry. To support secure and scalab…

cs.CR2023★ 4 cited

The Janus Interface: How Fine-Tuning in Large Language Models Amplifies the Privacy Risks

Xiaoyi Chen, Siyuan Tang, Rui Zhu +7

The rapid advancements of large language models (LLMs) have raised public concerns about the privacy leakage of personally identifiable information (PII) within their extensive tra…

cs.CL2023★ 1 cited

Large Language Model Soft Ideologization via AI-Self-Consciousness

Xiaotian Zhou, Qian Wang, Xiaofeng Wang +2

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated human-level performance on a vast spectrum of natural language tasks. However, few studies have addressed the LLM threat and vulnerab…

cs.CR2023★ 5 cited

Gradient Shaping: Enhancing Backdoor Attack Against Reverse Engineering

Rui Zhu, Di Tang, Siyuan Tang +4

Most existing methods to detect backdoored machine learning (ML) models take one of the two approaches: trigger inversion (aka. reverse engineer) and weight analysis (aka. model di…

cs.LG2022★ 16 cited

Selective Amnesia: On Efficient, High-Fidelity and Blind Suppression of Backdoor Effects in Trojaned Machine Learning Models

Rui Zhu, Di Tang, Siyuan Tang +2

In this paper, we present a simple yet surprisingly effective technique to induce "selective amnesia" on a backdoored model. Our approach, called SEAM, has been inspired by the pro…

cs.CR2022★ 2 cited

Understanding Impacts of Task Similarity on Backdoor Attack and Detection

Di Tang, Rui Zhu, XiaoFeng Wang +2

With extensive studies on backdoor attack and detection, still fundamental questions are left unanswered regarding the limits in the adversary's capability to attack and the defend…

cs.CR2021★ 4 cited

Understanding TEE Containers, Easy to Use? Hard to Trust

Weijie Liu, Hongbo Chen, XiaoFeng Wang +4

As an emerging technique for confidential computing, trusted execution environment (TEE) receives a lot of attention. To better develop, deploy, and run secure applications on a TE…

cs.CR2021

HySec-Flow: Privacy-Preserving Genomic Computing with SGX-based Big-Data Analytics Framework

Chathura Widanage, Weijie Liu, Jiayu Li +4

Trusted execution environments (TEE) such as Intel's Software Guard Extension (SGX) have been widely studied to boost security and privacy protection for the computation of sensiti…

cs.CR2020★ 2 cited

Confidential Attestation: Efficient in-Enclave Verification of Privacy Policy Compliance

Weijie Liu, Wenhao Wang, Xiaofeng Wang +9

A trusted execution environment (TEE) such as Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) runs a remote attestation to prove to a data owner the integrity of the initial state of an encla…

cs.CR2019★ 74 cited

Demon in the Variant: Statistical Analysis of DNNs for Robust Backdoor Contamination Detection

Di Tang, XiaoFeng Wang, Haixu Tang +1

A security threat to deep neural networks (DNN) is backdoor contamination, in which an adversary poisons the training data of a target model to inject a Trojan so that images carry…

cs.CR2019★ 15 cited

Toward Scalable Fully Homomorphic Encryption Through Light Trusted Computing Assistance

Wenhao Wang, Yichen Jiang, Qintao Shen +8

It has been a long standing problem to securely outsource computation tasks to an untrusted party with integrity and confidentiality guarantees. While fully homomorphic encryption…

cs.CR2018★ 161 cited

Understanding Membership Inferences on Well-Generalized Learning Models

Yunhui Long, Vincent Bindschaedler, Lei Wang +5

Membership Inference Attack (MIA) determines the presence of a record in a machine learning model's training data by querying the model. Prior work has shown that the attack is fea…

cs.CR2017★ 326 cited

Leaky Cauldron on the Dark Land: Understanding Memory Side-Channel Hazards in SGX

Wenhao Wang, Guoxing Chen, Xiaorui Pan +5

Side-channel risks of Intel's SGX have recently attracted great attention. Under the spotlight is the newly discovered page-fault attack, in which an OS-level adversary induces pag…