326 citations · 360 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
Understanding TEE Containers, Easy to Use? Hard to Trust
Weijie Liu, Hongbo Chen, XiaoFeng Wang +4
As an emerging technique for confidential computing, trusted execution environment (TEE) receives a lot of attention. To better develop, deploy, and run secure applications on a TE…
Randomized Last-Level Caches Are Still Vulnerable to Cache Side-Channel Attacks! But We Can Fix It
Wei Song, Boya Li, Zihan Xue +3
Cache randomization has recently been revived as a promising defense against conflict-based cache side-channel attacks. As two of the latest implementations, CEASER-S and ScatterCa…
Confidential Attestation: Efficient in-Enclave Verification of Privacy Policy Compliance
Weijie Liu, Wenhao Wang, Xiaofeng Wang +9
A trusted execution environment (TEE) such as Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) runs a remote attestation to prove to a data owner the integrity of the initial state of an encla…
Toward Scalable Fully Homomorphic Encryption Through Light Trusted Computing Assistance
Wenhao Wang, Yichen Jiang, Qintao Shen +8
It has been a long standing problem to securely outsource computation tasks to an untrusted party with integrity and confidentiality guarantees. While fully homomorphic encryption…
Enabling Privacy-Preserving, Compute- and Data-Intensive Computing using Heterogeneous Trusted Execution Environment
Jianping Zhu, Rui Hou, XiaoFeng Wang +9
There is an urgent demand for privacy-preserving techniques capable of supporting compute and data intensive (CDI) computing in the era of big data. However, none of existing TEEs…
Leaky Cauldron on the Dark Land: Understanding Memory Side-Channel Hazards in SGX
Wenhao Wang, Guoxing Chen, Xiaorui Pan +5
Side-channel risks of Intel's SGX have recently attracted great attention. Under the spotlight is the newly discovered page-fault attack, in which an OS-level adversary induces pag…