156 citations · 253 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers
Activation Functions Considered Harmful: Recovering Neural Network Weights through Controlled Channels
Jesse Spielman, David Oswald, Mark Ryan +1
With high-stakes machine learning applications increasingly moving to untrusted end-user or cloud environments, safeguarding pre-trained model parameters becomes essential for prot…
CopyCat: Controlled Instruction-Level Attacks on Enclaves
Daniel Moghimi, Jo Van Bulck, Nadia Heninger +2
The adversarial model presented by trusted execution environments (TEEs) has prompted researchers to investigate unusual attack vectors. One particularly powerful class of controll…
Provably Secure Isolation for Interruptible Enclaved Execution on Small Microprocessors: Extended Version
Matteo Busi, Job Noorman, Jo Van Bulck +4
Computer systems often provide hardware support for isolation mechanisms like privilege levels, virtual memory, or enclaved execution. Over the past years, several successful softw…
Fallout: Reading Kernel Writes From User Space
Marina Minkin, Daniel Moghimi, Moritz Lipp +7
Recently, out-of-order execution, an important performance optimization in modern high-end processors, has been revealed to pose a significant security threat, allowing information…
ZombieLoad: Cross-Privilege-Boundary Data Sampling
Michael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp, Daniel Moghimi +4
In early 2018, Meltdown first showed how to read arbitrary kernel memory from user space by exploiting side-effects from transient instructions. While this attack has been mitigate…
A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and Defenses
Claudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz +6
Research on transient execution attacks including Spectre and Meltdown showed that exception or branch misprediction events might leave secret-dependent traces in the CPU's microar…