activity
20192026
most citedZombieLoad: Cross-Privilege-Boundary Data Sampling

50 citations · 136 across the 8 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

8 papers

cs.CR2026

Security Assessment of Intel TDX with support for Live Migration

Kirk Swidowski, Daniel Moghimi, Josh Eads +2

In the second and third quarters of 2025, Google collaborated with Intel to conduct a security assessment of Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX), extending Google's previous review…

cs.CR2025

SNPeek: Side-Channel Analysis for Privacy Applications on Confidential VMs

Ruiyi Zhang, Albert Cheu, Adria Gascon +4

Confidential virtual machines (CVMs) based on trusted execution environments (TEEs) enable new privacy-preserving solutions. Yet, they leave side-channel leakage outside their thre…

cs.CR2020★ 2 cited

Data Sampling on MDS-resistant 10th Generation Intel Core (Ice Lake)

Daniel Moghimi

Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) is a set of hardware vulnerabilities in Intel CPUs that allows an attacker to leak bytes of data from memory loads and stores across various…

cs.CR2020★ 7 cited

CopyCat: Controlled Instruction-Level Attacks on Enclaves

Daniel Moghimi, Jo Van Bulck, Nadia Heninger +2

The adversarial model presented by trusted execution environments (TEEs) has prompted researchers to investigate unusual attack vectors. One particularly powerful class of controll…

cs.CR2019★ 14 cited

JackHammer: Efficient Rowhammer on Heterogeneous FPGA-CPU Platforms

Zane Weissman, Thore Tiemann, Daniel Moghimi +3

After years of development, FPGAs are finally making an appearance on multi-tenant cloud servers. These heterogeneous FPGA-CPU architectures break common assumptions about isolatio…

cs.CR2019★ 24 cited

TPM-FAIL: TPM meets Timing and Lattice Attacks

Daniel Moghimi, Berk Sunar, Thomas Eisenbarth +1

Trusted Platform Module (TPM) serves as a hardware-based root of trust that protects cryptographic keys from privileged system and physical adversaries. In this work, we perform a…