100 citations · 229 across the 26 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers · 1 filter
Path Planning Problems with Side Observations-When Colonels Play Hide-and-Seek
Dong Quan Vu, Patrick Loiseau, Alonso Silva +1
Resource allocation games such as the famous Colonel Blotto (CB) and Hide-and-Seek (HS) games are often used to model a large variety of practical problems, but only in their one-s…
Defending with Shared Resources on a Network
Minming Li, Long Tran-Thanh, Xiaowei Wu
In this paper we consider a defending problem on a network. In the model, the defender holds a total defending resource of R, which can be distributed to the nodes of the network.…
Social Cost Guarantees in Smart Route Guidance
Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre, Long Tran-Thanh +3
We model and study the problem of assigning traffic in an urban road network infrastructure. In our model, each driver submits their intended destination and is assigned a route to…
Manipulating a Learning Defender and Ways to Counteract
Jiarui Gan, Qingyu Guo, Long Tran-Thanh +2
In Stackelberg security games when information about the attacker's payoffs is uncertain, algorithms have been proposed to learn the optimal defender commitment by interacting with…
Path Planning Problems with Side Observations-When Colonels Play Hide-and-Seek
Dong Quan Vu, Patrick Loiseau, Alonso Silva +1
Resource allocation games such as the famous Colonel Blotto (CB) and Hide-and-Seek (HS) games are often used to model a large variety of practical problems, but only in their one-s…
Imitative Follower Deception in Stackelberg Games
Jiarui Gan, Haifeng Xu, Qingyu Guo +3
Information uncertainty is one of the major challenges facing applications of game theory. In the context of Stackelberg games, various approaches have been proposed to deal with t…
On the Inducibility of Stackelberg Equilibrium for Security Games
Qingyu Guo, Jiarui Gan, Fei Fang +3
Strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is the standard solution concept of Stackelberg security games. As opposed to the weak Stackelberg equilibrium (WSE), the SSE assumes that the…
Designing the Game to Play: Optimizing Payoff Structure in Security Games
Zheyuan Ryan Shi, Ziye Tang, Long Tran-Thanh +2
Effective game-theoretic modeling of defender-attacker behavior is becoming increasingly important. In many domains, the defender functions not only as a player but also the design…
Bounding the Estimation Error of Sampling-based Shapley Value Approximation
Sasan Maleki, Long Tran-Thanh, Greg Hines +2
The Shapley value is arguably the most central normative solution concept in cooperative game theory. It specifies a unique way in which the reward from cooperation can be "fairly"…