activity
20142025
most citedRMIX: Learning Risk-Sensitive Policies for Cooperative Reinforcement Learning Agents

16 citations · 39 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

13 papers

cs.GT2025

Verifying Proportionality in Temporal Voting

Edith Elkind, Svetlana Obraztsova, Jannik Peters +1

We study a model of temporal voting where there is a fixed time horizon, and at each round the voters report their preferences over the available candidates and a single candidate…

cs.GT2023★ 1 cited

Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Voting

Edith Elkind, Svetlana Obraztsova, Nicholas Teh

Multiwinner voting captures a wide variety of settings, from parliamentary elections in democratic systems to product placement in online shopping platforms. There is a large body…

cs.MA2022★ 1 cited

RPM: Generalizable Behaviors for Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

Wei Qiu, Xiao Ma, Bo An +3

Despite the recent advancement in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), the MARL agents easily overfit the training environment and perform poorly in the evaluation scenarios…

cs.MA2022

Off-Beat Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

Wei Qiu, Weixun Wang, Rundong Wang +7

We investigate model-free multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) in environments where off-beat actions are prevalent, i.e., all actions have pre-set execution durations. During…

cs.LG2021★ 11 cited

Mis-spoke or mis-lead: Achieving Robustness in Multi-Agent Communicative Reinforcement Learning

Wanqi Xue, Wei Qiu, Bo An +3

Recent studies in multi-agent communicative reinforcement learning (MACRL) have demonstrated that multi-agent coordination can be greatly improved by allowing communication between…

cs.LG2021★ 16 cited

RMIX: Learning Risk-Sensitive Policies for Cooperative Reinforcement Learning Agents

Wei Qiu, Xinrun Wang, Runsheng Yu +5

Current value-based multi-agent reinforcement learning methods optimize individual Q values to guide individuals' behaviours via centralized training with decentralized execution (…

cs.GT2019

Manipulating Elections by Selecting Issues

Jasper Lu, David Kai Zhang, Zinovi Rabinovich +2

Constructive election control considers the problem of an adversary who seeks to sway the outcome of an electoral process in order to ensure that their favored candidate wins. We c…

cs.GT2019

Protecting Elections by Recounting Ballots

Edith Elkind, Jiarui Gan, Svetlana Obraztsova +2

Complexity of voting manipulation is a prominent topic in computational social choice. In this work, we consider a two-stage voting manipulation scenario. First, a malicious party…

cs.CY2019★ 5 cited

Lie on the Fly: Strategic Voting in an Iterative Preference Elicitation Process

Lihi Dery, Svetlana Obraztsova, Zinovi Rabinovich +1

A voting center is in charge of collecting and aggregating voter preferences. In an iterative process, the center sends comparison queries to voters, requesting them to submit thei…

cs.CY2019★ 3 cited

Reaching Consensus Under a Deadline

Marina Bannikova, Lihi Dery, Svetlana Obraztsova +2

Committee decisions are complicated by a deadline, e.g., the next start of a budget, or the beginning of a semester. In committee hiring decisions, it may be that if no candidate i…

cs.GT2018

Heuristic Voting as Ordinal Dominance Strategies

Omer Lev, Reshef Meir, Svetlana Obraztsova +1

Decision making under uncertainty is a key component of many AI settings, and in particular of voting scenarios where strategic agents are trying to reach a joint decision. The com…

cs.GT2016

Teams in Online Scheduling Polls: Game-Theoretic Aspects

Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, Rolf Niedermeier +2

Consider an important meeting to be held in a team-based organization. Taking availability constraints into account, an online scheduling poll is being used in order to decide upon…

cs.GT2014★ 2 cited

Equilibria of Plurality Voting: Lazy and Truth-biased Voters

Edith Elkind, Evangelos Markakis, Svetlana Obraztsova +1

We present a systematic study of Plurality elections with strategic voters who, in addition to having preferences over election winners, have secondary preferences, which govern th…