activity
20152025
most citedSmashEx: Smashing SGX Enclaves Using Exceptions

34 citations · 166 across the 24 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

24 papers

cs.CR2025★ 3 cited

OpenCCA: An Open Framework to Enable Arm CCA Research

Andrin Bertschi, Shweta Shinde

Confidential computing has gained traction across major architectures with Intel TDX, AMD SEV-SNP, and Arm CCA. Unlike TDX and SEV-SNP, a key challenge in researching Arm CCA is th…

cs.CR2024

Devlore: Device Interrupt Protection for Confidential VMs

Andrin Bertschi, Supraja Sridhara, Mark Kuhne +6

Modern confidential computing executes sensitive computation in an abstraction called confidential VMs and protects from the hypervisor, host OS, and other co-resident VMs. It has…

cs.CR2024

Aster: Fixing the Android TEE Ecosystem with Arm CCA

Mark Kuhne, Supraja Sridhara, Andrin Bertschi +3

The Android ecosystem relies on either TrustZone (e.g., OP-TEE, QTEE, Trusty) or trusted hypervisors (pKVM, Gunyah) to isolate security-sensitive services from malicious apps and A…

cs.CR2024

Rolling in the Shadows: Analyzing the Extraction of MEV Across Layer-2 Rollups

Christof Ferreira Torres, Albin Mamuti, Ben Weintraub +2

The emergence of decentralized finance has transformed asset trading on the blockchain, making traditional financial instruments more accessible while also introducing a series of…

cs.CR2024

SIGY: Breaking Intel SGX Enclaves with Malicious Exceptions & Signals

Supraja Sridhara, Andrin Bertschi, Benedict Schlüter +1

User programs recover from hardware exceptions and respond to signals by executing custom handlers that they register specifically for such events. We present SIGY attack, which ab…

cs.CR2024

WeSee: Using Malicious #VC Interrupts to Break AMD SEV-SNP

Benedict Schlüter, Supraja Sridhara, Andrin Bertschi +1

AMD SEV-SNP offers VM-level trusted execution environments (TEEs) to protect the confidentiality and integrity for sensitive cloud workloads from untrusted hypervisor controlled by…

cs.CR2024★ 7 cited

Heckler: Breaking Confidential VMs with Malicious Interrupts

Benedict Schlüter, Supraja Sridhara, Mark Kuhne +2

Hardware-based Trusted execution environments (TEEs) offer an isolation granularity of virtual machine abstraction. They provide confidential VMs (CVMs) that host security-sensitiv…

cs.CR2023★ 3 cited

Is Your Wallet Snitching On You? An Analysis on the Privacy Implications of Web3

Christof Ferreira Torres, Fiona Willi, Shweta Shinde

With the recent hype around the Metaverse and NFTs, Web3 is getting more and more popular. The goal of Web3 is to decentralize the web via decentralized applications. Wallets play…

cs.CR2023★ 8 cited

ACAI: Protecting Accelerator Execution with Arm Confidential Computing Architecture

Supraja Sridhara, Andrin Bertschi, Benedict Schlüter +3

Trusted execution environments in several existing and upcoming CPUs demonstrate the success of confidential computing, with the caveat that tenants cannot securely use accelerator…

cs.CR2022★ 1 cited

It's TEEtime: A New Architecture Bringing Sovereignty to Smartphones

Friederike Groschupp, Mark Kuhne, Moritz Schneider +3

Modern smartphones are complex systems in which control over phone resources is exercised by phone manufacturers, OS vendors, and users. These stakeholders have diverse and often c…

cs.CR2022★ 3 cited

Empowering Data Centers for Next Generation Trusted Computing

Aritra Dhar, Supraja Sridhara, Shweta Shinde +2

Modern data centers have grown beyond CPU nodes to provide domain-specific accelerators such as GPUs and FPGAs to their customers. From a security standpoint, cloud customers want…

cs.CR2022★ 29 cited

SoK: Hardware-supported Trusted Execution Environments

Moritz Schneider, Ramya Jayaram Masti, Shweta Shinde +2

The growing complexity of modern computing platforms and the need for strong isolation protections among their software components has led to the increased adoption of Trusted Exec…

cs.CR2021★ 34 cited

SmashEx: Smashing SGX Enclaves Using Exceptions

Jinhua Cui, Jason Zhijingcheng Yu, Shweta Shinde +2

Exceptions are a commodity hardware functionality which is central to multi-tasking OSes as well as event-driven user applications. Normally, the OS assists the user application by…

cs.CR2021★ 2 cited

Dynamic Binary Translation for SGX Enclaves

Jinhua Cui, Shweta Shinde, Satyaki Sen +2

Enclaves, such as those enabled by Intel SGX, offer a hardware primitive for shielding user-level applications from the OS. While enclaves are a useful starting point, code running…

cs.CR2021

Sovereign Smartphone: To Enjoy Freedom We Have to Control Our Phones

Friederike Groschupp, Moritz Schneider, Ivan Puddu +2

The majority of smartphones either run iOS or Android operating systems. This has created two distinct ecosystems largely controlled by Apple and Google - they dictate which applic…

cs.CR2020★ 7 cited

Elasticlave: An Efficient Memory Model for Enclaves

Zhijingcheng Yu, Shweta Shinde, Trevor E. Carlson +1

Trusted-execution environments (TEE), like Intel SGX, isolate user-space applications into secure enclaves without trusting the OS. Thus, TEEs reduce the trusted computing base, bu…

cs.CR2020★ 1 cited

Binary Compatibility For SGX Enclaves

Shweta Shinde, Jinhua Cui, Satyaki Sen +2

Enclaves, such as those enabled by Intel SGX, offer a powerful hardware isolation primitive for application partitioning. To become universally usable on future commodity OSes, enc…

cs.CR2019★ 25 cited

Keystone: An Open Framework for Architecting TEEs

Dayeol Lee, David Kohlbrenner, Shweta Shinde +2

Trusted execution environments (TEEs) are being used in all the devices from embedded sensors to cloud servers and encompass a range of cost, power constraints, and security threat…

cs.CR2019

Quantitative Verification of Neural Networks And its Security Applications

Teodora Baluta, Shiqi Shen, Shweta Shinde +2

Neural networks are increasingly employed in safety-critical domains. This has prompted interest in verifying or certifying logically encoded properties of neural networks. Prior w…

cs.CR2019

Practical Verifiable In-network Filtering for DDoS defense

Deli Gong, Muoi Tran, Shweta Shinde +4

In light of ever-increasing scale and sophistication of modern DDoS attacks, it is time to revisit in-network filtering or the idea of empowering DDoS victims to install in-network…

cs.CR2018★ 27 cited

Privado: Practical and Secure DNN Inference with Enclaves

Karan Grover, Shruti Tople, Shweta Shinde +2

Cloud providers are extending support for trusted hardware primitives such as Intel SGX. Simultaneously, the field of deep learning is seeing enormous innovation as well as an incr…

cs.PL2018★ 4 cited

Neuro-Symbolic Execution: The Feasibility of an Inductive Approach to Symbolic Execution

Shiqi Shen, Soundarya Ramesh, Shweta Shinde +2

Symbolic execution is a powerful technique for program analysis. However, it has many limitations in practical applicability: the path explosion problem encumbers scalability, the…

cs.CR2018

BesFS: A POSIX Filesystem for Enclaves with a Mechanized Safety Proof

Shweta Shinde, Shengyi Wang, Pinghai Yuan +3

New trusted computing primitives such as Intel SGX have shown the feasibility of running user-level applications in enclaves on a commodity trusted processor without trusting a lar…

cs.CR2015★ 12 cited

Preventing Your Faults From Telling Your Secrets: Defenses Against Pigeonhole Attacks

Shweta Shinde, Zheng Leong Chua, Viswesh Narayanan +1

New hardware primitives such as Intel SGX secure a user-level process in presence of an untrusted or compromised OS. Such "enclaved execution" systems are vulnerable to several sid…