4 citations · 33 across the 44 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers · 1 filter
Vickrey Auctions for Irregular Distributions
Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis
The classic result of Bulow and Klemperer \cite{BK96} says that in a single-item auction recruiting one more bidder and running the Vickrey auction achieves a higher revenue than t…
Cost-Recovering Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design
Hu Fu, Brendan Lucier, Balasubramanian Sivan +1
We study the design of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms in single parameter domains, for the objective of optimizing social efficiency as measured by social cost. In the pr…
Prior-Independent Mechanisms for Scheduling
Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, David Malec +1
We study the makespan minimization problem with unrelated selfish machines under the assumption that job sizes are stochastic. We design simple truthful mechanisms that under vario…