4 citations · 33 across the 44 of their papers we have counts for
34 papers · 1 filter
Resource Allocation and Conversion along the Org Chart
Yuan Deng, Giannis Fikioris, Chido Onyeze +3
We consider the allocation of multiple heterogeneous resources to agents who are organized according to an organizational hierarchy. In a company those correspond to business units…
Learning vs. Optimizing Bidders in Budgeted Auctions
Giannis Fikioris, Balasubramanian Sivan, Éva Tardos
The study of repeated interactions between a learner and a utility-maximizing optimizer has yielded deep insights into the manipulability of learning algorithms. However, existing…
Swap Regret and Correlated Equilibria Beyond Normal-Form Games
Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran, Natalie Collina, Yishay Mansour +3
Swap regret is a notion that has proven itself to be central to the study of general-sum normal-form games, with swap-regret minimization leading to convergence to the set of corre…
Approximately Efficient Bilateral Trade with Samples
Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Balasubramanian Sivan +2
We study the social efficiency of bilateral trade between a seller and a buyer. In the classical Bayesian setting, the celebrated Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem states…
Auto-bidding and Auctions in Online Advertising: A Survey
Gagan Aggarwal, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Santiago R. Balseiro +23
In this survey, we summarize recent developments in research fueled by the growing adoption of automated bidding strategies in online advertising. We explore the challenges and opp…
Revenue Variance Minimization: Beyond First Price Auctions
Marek Bojko, Preston McAfee, Renato Paes Leme +2
We study revenue variance in the sale of homogeneous items to risk-neutral, unit-demand bidders with independent private values. Although the Revenue Equivalence Theorem implie…
Strategically-Robust Learning Algorithms for Bidding in First-Price Auctions
Rachitesh Kumar, Jon Schneider, Balasubramanian Sivan
Learning to bid in repeated first-price auctions is a fundamental problem at the interface of game theory and machine learning, which has seen a recent surge in interest due to the…
Description Complexity of Regular Distributions
Renato Paes Leme, Balasubramanian Sivan, Yifeng Teng +1
Myerson's regularity condition of a distribution is a standard assumption in economics. In this paper, we study the complexity of describing a regular distribution within a small s…
A Field Guide for Pacing Budget and ROS Constraints
Santiago R. Balseiro, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Zhe Feng +4
Budget pacing is a popular service that has been offered by major internet advertising platforms since their inception. Budget pacing systems seek to optimize advertiser returns su…
Price Manipulability in First-Price Auctions
Johannes Brustle, Paul Dütting, Balasubramanian Sivan
First-price auctions have many desirable properties, including uniquely possessing some, like credibility. However, first-price auctions are also inherently non-truthful, and non-t…
Pricing Query Complexity of Revenue Maximization
Renato Paes Leme, Balasubramanian Sivan, Yifeng Teng +1
The common way to optimize auction and pricing systems is to set aside a small fraction of the traffic to run experiments. This leads to the question: how can we learn the most wit…
Approximately Efficient Bilateral Trade
Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Balasubramanian Sivan +1
We study bilateral trade between two strategic agents. The celebrated result of Myerson and Satterthwaite states that in general, no incentive-compatible, individually rational and…
Online Allocation and Display Ads Optimization with Surplus Supply
Melika Abolhassani, Hossein Esfandiari, Yasamin Nazari +3
In this work, we study a scenario where a publisher seeks to maximize its total revenue across two sales channels: guaranteed contracts that promise to deliver a certain number of…
Learning to Price Against a Moving Target
Renato Paes Leme, Balasubramanian Sivan, Yifeng Teng +1
In the Learning to Price setting, a seller posts prices over time with the goal of maximizing revenue while learning the buyer's valuation. This problem is very well understood whe…
Optimal Pricing Schemes for an Impatient Buyer
Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Balasubramanian Sivan +1
A patient seller aims to sell a good to an impatient buyer (i.e., one who discounts utility over time). The buyer will remain in the market for a period of time , and her privat…
Why Do Competitive Markets Converge to First-Price Auctions?
Renato Paes Leme, Balasubramanian Sivan, Yifeng Teng
We consider a setting in which bidders participate in multiple auctions run by different sellers, and optimize their bids for the \emph{aggregate} auction. We analyze this setting…
Strategizing against No-regret Learners
Yuan Deng, Jon Schneider, Balusubramanian Sivan
How should a player who repeatedly plays a game against a no-regret learner strategize to maximize his utility? We study this question and show that under some mild assumptions, th…
Separation between Second Price Auctions with Personalized Reserves and the Revenue Optimal Auction
Will Ma, Balasubramanian Sivan
What fraction of the single item buyers setting's expected optimal revenue MyeRev can the second price auction with reserves achieve? In the special case where the buyers' valu…
Dynamic First Price Auctions Robust to Heterogeneous Buyers
Shipra Agrawal, Eric Balkanski, Vahab Mirrokni +1
We study dynamic mechanisms for optimizing revenue in repeated auctions, that are robust to heterogeneous forward-looking and learning behavior of the buyers. Typically it is assum…
Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms
Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Negin Golrezaei, Renato Paes Leme +2
We study revenue maximization through sequential posted-price (SPP) mechanisms in single-dimensional settings with buyers and independent but not necessarily identical value di…
Robust Repeated Auctions under Heterogeneous Buyer Behavior
Shipra Agrawal, Constantinos Daskalakis, Vahab Mirrokni +1
We study revenue optimization in a repeated auction between a single seller and a single buyer. Traditionally, the design of repeated auctions requires strong modeling assumptions…
Stability of Service under Time-of-Use Pricing
Shuchi Chawla, Nikhil R. Devanur, Alexander E. Holroyd +3
We consider "time-of-use" pricing as a technique for matching supply and demand of temporal resources with the goal of maximizing social welfare. Relevant examples include energy,…
Truthful Multi-Parameter Auctions with Online Supply: an Impossible Combination
Nikhil R. Devanur, Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis
We study a basic auction design problem with online supply. There are two unit-demand bidders and two types of items. The first item type will arrive first for sure, and the second…
How to sell an app: pay-per-play or buy-it-now?
Shuchi Chawla, Nikhil R. Devanur, Anna Karlin +1
We consider pricing in settings where a consumer discovers his value for a good only as he uses it, and the value evolves with each use. We explore simple and natural pricing strat…