17 citations · 38 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for
12 papers · 1 filter
Unified Fair Allocation of Goods and Chores via Copies
Yotam Gafni, Xin Huang, Ron Lavi +1
We consider fair allocation of indivisible items in a model with goods, chores, and copies, as a unified framework for studying: (1)~the existence of EFX and other solution concept…
Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with Application to False-name Manipulation
Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz
Weighted voting games apply to a wide variety of multi-agent settings. They enable the formalization of power indices which quantify the coalitional power of players. We take a nov…
From Monopoly to Competition: Optimal Contests Prevail
Xiaotie Deng, Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi +2
We study competition among contests in a general model that allows for an arbitrary and heterogeneous space of contest design, where the goal of the contest designers is to maximiz…
Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency
Tal Alon, Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash +1
We study contract design for welfare maximization in the well known "common agency" model of [Bernheim and Whinston, 1986]. This model combines the challenges of coordinating multi…
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Empirical Revenue Maximization Algorithm with Endogenous Sampling
Xiaotie Deng, Ron Lavi, Tao Lin +3
The Empirical Revenue Maximization (ERM) is one of the most important price learning algorithms in auction design: as the literature shows it can learn approximately optimal reserv…
Stateful Posted Pricing with Vanishing Regret via Dynamic Deterministic Markov Decision Processes
Yuval Emek, Ron Lavi, Rad Niazadeh +1
In this paper, a rather general online problem called dynamic resource allocation with capacity constraints (DRACC) is introduced and studied in the realm of posted price mechanism…
VCG Under False-name Attacks: a Bayesian Analysis
Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz
VCG is a classical combinatorial auction that maximizes social welfare. However, while the standard single-item Vickrey auction is false-name-proof, a major failure of multi-item V…
Bayesian Generalized Network Design
Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi +1
We study network coordination problems, as captured by the setting of generalized network design (Emek et al., STOC 2018), in the face of uncertainty resulting from partial informa…
Asymptotically Efficient Multi-Unit Auctions via Posted Prices
Urban Larsson, Ron Lavi
We study the asymptotic average-case efficiency of static and anonymous posted prices for agents and multiple identical items with .…
Approximating Generalized Network Design under (Dis)economies of Scale with Applications to Energy Efficiency
Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi +1
In a generalized network design (GND) problem, a set of resources are assigned to multiple communication requests. Each request contributes its weight to the resources it uses and…
Ascending auctions and Walrasian equilibrium
Oren Ben-Zwi, Ron Lavi, Ilan Newman
We present a family of submodular valuation classes that generalizes gross substitute. We show that Walrasian equilibrium always exist for one class in this family, and there is a…
Composition Games for Distributed Systems: the EU Grant games
Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Amitabh Trehan
We analyze ways by which people decompose into groups in distributed systems. We are interested in systems in which an agent can increase its utility by connecting to other agents,…