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20182026
most citedEquilibrium Problems and Proximal Algorithms in Hadamard Spaces

11 citations · 14 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for

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6 papers · 1 filter

eess.SY2025

A Stackelberg Game of Demand Response from the Aggregator's Perspective

Seangleng Khe, Parin Chaipunya, Athikom Bangviwat

In this paper, we investigate on the modeling of demand response activities between the single aggregator and multiple participating consumers. The model incorporates the bilevel s…

math.OC2025

A self-adaptive subgradient extragradient method with conjugate gradient-type direction for pseudomonotone variational inequalities

Ibrahim Arzuka, Parin Chaipunya, Poom Kumam

This paper introduces a subgradient extragradient algorithm with a conjugate gradient-type direction to solve pseudomonotone variational inequality problems in Hilbert spaces. The…

math.FA2025

A product of strongly quasi-nonexpansive mappings in Hadamard spaces

Wiparat Worapitpong, Parin Chaipunya, Poom Kumam +1

In this paper, we prove that the product of strongly quasi-nonexpansive -demiclosed mappings is also a strongly quasi-nonexpansive orbital -demiclosed mapping in Hadamard spa…

math.FA2025

Variational principles using a non-symmetric non-triangular distance

Natthaya Boonyam, Parin Chaipunya, Poom Kumam

We consider Borwein-Preiss and Ekeland variational principles using distance functions that neither is symmetric nor enjoy the triangular inequality. All the given results rely exc…

math.OC2025

An existence theorem for single leader multi-follower games with direct preference maps

Yutthakan Chummongkhon, Poom Kumam, Parin Chaipunya

This paper concerns with an existence of a solution for a single leader multi-follower game (SLMFG), where the followers jointly solve an abstract economy problem. Recall that an a…

math.OC2025

KKT Reformulations for Single Leader and Multi-Follower Games

Parin Chaipunya, Thirumulanathan D, Joydeep Dutta

We consider a bilevel optimization problem having a single leader and multiple followers. The followers choose their strategies simultaneously, and are assumed to converge to a Nas…