1 citations · 1 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
14 papers
Welfare Approximation in Multilateral Trade
Tomer Ezra, Aadityan Ganesh, Aviad Rubinstein
We introduce the study of \emph{multilateral trade}: a mechanism-design problem in which a single potential trade involves agents and can be executed only if all agents agr…
Optimal Prior-Free Mechanisms for Consumer Surplus
Tomer Ezra
We settle the worst-case approximability of residual-surplus maximization in general multidimensional mechanism-design environments. For agents with arbitrary nonnegative valua…
Multi-Agent Contracts
Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman +1
We study a natural combinatorial single-principal multi-agent contract design problem, in which a principal motivates a team of agents to exert effort toward a given task. At the h…
Contract Design Beyond Hidden-Actions
Tomer Ezra, Stefano Leonardi, Matteo Russo
In the classical principal-agent hidden-action contract model, a principal delegates the execution of a costly task to an agent. In order to complete the task, the agent chooses an…
Black-Box Lifting and Robustness Theorems for Multi-Agent Contracts
Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman +1
Multi-agent contract design has largely evaluated contracts through the lens of pure Nash equilibria (PNE). This focus, however, is not without loss: In general, the principal can…
Combinatorial Contracts
Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman +1
We introduce a new model of combinatorial contracts in which a principal delegates the execution of a costly task to an agent. To complete the task, the agent can take any subset o…