17 citations · 32 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers
Foundations of Platform-Assisted Auctions
Hao Chung, Ke Wu, Elaine Shi
Today, many auctions are carried out with the help of intermediary platforms like Google and eBay. We refer to such auctions as platform-assisted auctions.Traditionally, the auctio…
Collusion-Resilience in Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Hao Chung, Tim Roughgarden, Elaine Shi
Users bid in a transaction fee mechanism (TFM) to get their transactions included and confirmed by a blockchain protocol. Roughgarden (EC'21) initiated the formal treatment of TFMs…
Maximizing Miner Revenue in Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Ke Wu, Elaine Shi, Hao Chung
Transaction fee mechanism design is a new decentralized mechanism design problem where users bid for space on the blockchain. Several recent works showed that the transaction fee m…
What Can Cryptography Do For Decentralized Mechanism Design
Elaine Shi, Hao Chung, Ke Wu
Recent works of Roughgarden (EC'21) and Chung and Shi (SODA'23) initiate the study of a new decentralized mechanism design problem called transaction fee mechanism design (TFM). Un…
Foundations of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Hao Chung, Elaine Shi
In blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, users compete in a transaction fee auction to get their transactions confirmed in the next block. A line of recent works set forth the…
Fair Byzantine Agreements for Blockchains
Tzu-Wei Chao, Hao Chung, Po-Chun Kuo
Byzantine general problem is the core problem of the consensus algorithm, and many protocols are proposed recently to improve the decentralization level, the performance and the se…