activity
20182021
most citedEvaluation of Machine Learning-based Anomaly Detection Algorithms on an Industrial Modbus/TCP Data Set

90 citations · 133 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

13 papers

cs.CR2021

An Adaptive Honeypot Configuration, Deployment and Maintenance Strategy

Daniel Fraunholz, Marc Zimmermann, Hans D. Schotten

Since honeypots first appeared as an advanced network security concept they suffer from poor deployment and maintenance strategies. State-of-the-Art deployment is a manual process…

cs.CR20212 cited

Deep Down the Rabbit Hole: On References in Networks of Decoy Elements

Daniel Reti, Daniel Fraunholz, Janis Zemitis +2

Deception technology has proven to be a sound approach against threats to information systems. Aside from well-established honeypots, decoy elements, also known as honeytokens, are…

cs.CR2021

A Qualitative Empirical Analysis of Human Post-Exploitation Behavior

Daniel Schneider, Daniel Fraunholz, Daniel Krohmer

Honeypots are a well-studied defensive measure in network security. This work proposes an effective low-cost honeypot that is easy to deploy and maintain. The honeypot introduced i…

cs.CR2020

Investigating the Ecosystem of Offensive Information Security Tools

Simon D Duque Anton, Daniel Fraunholz, Daniel Schneider

The internet landscape is growing and at the same time becoming more heterogeneous. Services are performed via computers and networks, critical data is stored digitally. This enabl…

cs.SE20202 cited

Creating it from SCRATCh: A Practical Approach for Enhancing the Security of IoT-Systems in a DevOps-enabled Software Development Environment

Simon D Duque Anton, Daniel Fraunholz, Daniel Krohmer +9

DevOps describes a method to reorganize the way different disciplines in software engineering work together to speed up software delivery. However, the introduction of DevOps-metho…

cs.CR20196 cited

Using Temporal and Topological Features for Intrusion Detection in Operational Networks

Simon D. Duque Anton, Daniel Fraunholz, Hans Dieter Schotten

Until two decades ago, industrial networks were deemed secure due to physical separation from public networks. An abundance of successful attacks proved that assumption wrong. Intr…